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- All~YSIS-
Introductory Uote, PP• 6-9 • 
-~he distinction between secondary and efficient causation. 
-The study of efficient causation in history has been 
generally termed the "Philosophy of History". 
-This latter. designation is inaccurate. 
-Also loosely used it begs the question. 
-The term efficient causation notopen to these objections. 
-The purpose of the dissertation; 
-To set forth the problem of effie ient causation in 
history. 
-Prompted by a double conviction: 
(1) The pres~~1stage of thought makes possible a more 
adequate treatment tlmn formerly. 
( 2) Frauk facing of the problem would prove an impetus 
. to progress in both the philosophical and historical 
fields. 
-tiakea no claim to exhaustive treatmeut: the aim is a brief 
yet proportionate ·presentation. . 
I. A PLEA. FOR i:.. CJJJDID Flo.CIUG OF THE PROBi.E11 OF EFFlCIEirT Ci .. USi.TIOU llT 
HISTORY. pp 10-20. 
A. The Problem Cannot Be Avoided By The Thinking :!.lind. pp. 10-14. 
-The attempt of agnosticism to forestall inquiry into 
efficient causation. p. 10. 
-Agnosticism not reasoned argument, but presumption. 
-Positive considerations: 
{a) Every step in tracing secondary causation in nature, by 
forcing upon the attention what is implied in our total 
knouledge, brings us nearer to the dee1:e r question of 
efficient causation. 
(b) Every one when studying the material world, consciously 
or unconsciously, holds a theory of efficient causation. 
Herbert Spencer's &dmiasion. 
(c) The irtrpossibility of avoiding the problem doubly evident 
'llhen human conduct becomes the object of inquiry: 
-Every individual holds a philosophy of conduct. 
-Every individual naturally interprets history ,which 
is· a study of soci~Jl conduct, by means of the philosophy 
which he holds of his own personal conduct. 
-llany howeve7; refrain from doing'Jt-his natural thing. 
B. The Problem Has not Been Avoided By Historians.pp 14-15 .. 
-Every historian either avows or ass.umes a theory of efficient 
causatiou. 
-The folly of denying the right of definitely facing philosophi-
cal questions in the realm of history is therefore.obvioua. 
-The folly of a ~eak and vacillating indifference to these 
questions is equally apparent. 
-Such dt:nial or .indifference makes I)) ssible the garbling of 
history to support most contrauictory doctrines. 
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-The most important thing about any historian is the set 
of principles by which he interprets human conduct. 
c. The Problem Is L:ore Pressing Today Than Ever Before.pp. 15-16. 
, D· 
(a) Because of the stage reachediin~the evolution of 
knowledge: _ 
-The date have been largely gathered and sifted. 
Collections of sources constitute the bulk of the 
historical publications of today. 
-The dominant interest rm.tst more and more shift from 
the discovery of facts to their interpretation. 
(b) Because of the clear cut distinction now recognized be-
tween the province of science anu that of philosophy' 
-The conflict bet">ween science anu philosophy, prompted 
and n~intained by ignorance, is comiU£; to an end. 
-The new Socio-Psychological school of historical 
writers, in fr~nk reco~1ition that they deal alone 
with secondary causation, furnishes an illustration 
of this change. 
The Problem Thrust Into The Foreground By The Development Of 
Historical ~riting.pp.l?-20. 
-This development is from the chronicler to the philoa:>-
phical historian. 
-The limitations upon the evolution of historical writing 
in the Classio llorld noted: the narrow stage; the inability 
to co1.1prehend the unity of the race. 
-The historians of the l.liddle Ages were but chroniclers. 
-The i';.enaissance, reviving the Classic l~odels, brings a 
broad~r hiatorical outlook, liachie..velli, etc. 
-'l'he increased practical interest in the affairs of every 
day lifo usheredu.in by the Reformation. Sir \'falter Raleigh's 
History of the \7orld an illustration. 
-The ne>7 regard for practical life expresses itself, in the 
early eighteenth century, in the novel and the essay. 
-By the mi<iaJ.e of the eighteenth century it expresses it-
self in the narratives of the~iterat.Y!:listorians,-Voltaire, 
Hume, Robertson, Gibbon. ( -
-r/i th the opening of the ninteenth century two growing 
tendencies are notable: _ 
( J.} 1Iore scientific methods of getting at the facts. 
(2~ Still greater shifting of interest from politics 
to people. Sir '.!alter Scott, Eerder, liiebur and 
Ranke contribute to these tendenCies. Thierry, 
Hallam, Ranke and llichelet portray the course or 
civilizaticn so clearly as to greatly aid in pre~~ 
paring the way for the broad generalizatiun of 
Evolution. The·publication of Guisot's History of 
Civilization is the climax oft his period. 
-The larger outlook upon history gained in the period just 
described thrust the question of efficient causation to 
the front. This is proven by the many philosophies of 
history which appeared: Herder, I:egel, etc· • 
. -Similarly the larger outlook upon the unity of history 
and the progress of the race which came iu the second 
~. 
quarter of the ninteenth century. forced historians 
ane'.l to face the question of efficient causation. The 
result was the great "science of history" conflict. 
-The present tendencies in the historical field are: 
( 1) Intensi\f'e scientific study of isolated periods •. 
(2) Consciousness of the unity of history and the 
e6r~giutyQO~ progress. 
-This second tendency proves the first to be Dot· 
an end in itself' but a mere preparation :fb r a . 
more serious philosophical grasp of histo~A~\­
fore witnessed. 
II. - THE CRUCih.L POINTS OP THE PROBLEll.pp 21-27. 
The inquiry into efficient causation in history must center · 
around three points: 
A· The Idea Of Progress.pp 21-25. 
-First appears as the idea of cl~nge, and moves on to the con-
cept of advancing civilization. 
-This is the first matter, whether logieally or chronologically 
considered, to c~allenge the mind in its effcrts to explain 
history adequately. 
- The parallel in the rise of metaphysics in the realms of the 
inanimate and of history: the problem of becoming is the first 
problem in each field. 
-The idea of progress, as implying a goal, is today one of the 
outstanding convictions of the race. 
-It is not the product of conceit, but of insight. 
-True, iu its fuller seuse it is not shared by all; the simpler 
idea is universally held, aud pushes the mind to the d~Pth of 
spec"J.latiou. 
-In its fuller seuse th~ concf:!pt of -progress is teleological. 
-Philosophical implications of the idea further seen in the fact 
that the historian is constLutly forced back to en interpret-
ation of it, and that ret;erdless ofthe type of philosophy held. 
B. The Presence Of Evil, Error, i.nd Sin In l:uman Life.pp 25-27. 
-~he"beooming" which challenges m&n to his first philosophical 
speculation is soon recognized as e struggle between contrary 
forces. The darker side of experience thence resulting presents 
three aspects: 
(l) 'l'he presence of evil in nature. 
(2) The fact of error in hunnn thought. 
( 3) The problem of mornl evil. 
-11eliorism expresses, better than does either optimism or pess-
imism, the spirit of the modern world toward life. 
0. The Conviction Of J.gency J.nd Freedom Innate In llan. p .27. 
The ;n-iting of history is an effort to explliin human oouduct, 
and in mau's sense of responsibility is the most crucial fact 
in the situation. 
III. THE THIGE POSSIBLE THEORIES OF EFFICIENT CAUSATION. PP• 28-31. 
-In the writing·of history the greatest factor is the system of phil-
osophical principles held by the writer. 
-Only three theories of efficient causation in history are possible: 
Pluralistic Personalism, ~terialism, Monistic Persone.J.ism. Brief 
exposition of each. 
-Man's first philosophy, both racially and individually oonsidered, is 
Pluralistic Personalism in the form of .Animism. 
-Wider experience loads to gradual denial of personal agency in trees, 
rocks, etc. 
-Yihen this process culLlinates in total denial of personal 'Agency, l:ater-
ialism is born. 
-Though lJatorialism is not of modern origin, yet its greatest battles 
were fought in the ninteenth century. 
-A third view, lionistic Personalism or Absolutism, appears as a com-
promise view between Pluralistic Personalism and Uaterialism. Hegel 
U the greatest exponent of this philosophy as applied in history. 
IV. THE THiillE POSSIBLE V'EIJS TESTED BY THE TEREE CRUCIAL Fii.CTS.pp. 32-48. 
-Resume. 
-Exposition must now give way to more direct argqmentation. 
-The conttmtion shall be that Pluralistic Personalism is alone adequate 
to explain efficient causation in history. 
-lTo claim 'is r:Jntle to exhaustiveness of treatment: the aim is to indicate 
in brief and proportionate discussion, the main lines of argument. 
A.-Materialism.pp. 32-30. 
-Its affirmation is that all personal agency is delusive, and that 
material objects and fo1•ces are alone causative. 
-The materialist must first assuroe matter. 
-He muat next assume motion. 
-He must then assume tendencies to uuity and order. 
-After that he must assume life. 
-lli thin the sweep of these four assumptions everything up to the 
boarders of consciousness seems to be provided for. 
-Metaphysical criticism successfully challenges materialism in eech 
of these assumptions: the notions of matter, farce, law, etc. are 
empty abstractions. 
-Llaterialism seeks to explain consciousness in terms of motion and 
aggregation. 
-The oft urged argument against materialism that, according to its 
hypothesis, thephysical energy which passes into thought is then 
lost aud, hence, the law of the conservation of energy contrEtdicted, 
1 s not valid. 
-The real argument against materialism is that such '1hlction as 1 t allovts 
consciousness is not adequate to explain life. 
-The one alleged truth which materialism brings to bear upon history is 
that all is necessitated chang·e. 
-The materialist does not generally frankly race or state this con-
taction,- he generally covers it over by bringing in various 
"tendencies" and "influences". 
-uaterialism facing the fact of progress must either deny that fact or 
introduce the words "latent" and "possibility." 
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Either alternative is a failure. 
-Materialism with its conception of one.all-inclusive necessitated strean1, 
brought face to face \7i th thE: problems of evil, error, and ei n reduces all 
thought and all conduct to a like authority,r.aaking both truth anuporslity 
impossible. 
-L~aterialism ueclares r.Jan's sense of freedom is a delusion. 
-no history has been nor can be written from the viewpoint of materialism. 
B- Monistic Personalism or ~baolutism. PV• 38-43. 
c. 
-Its affirmation is that the finite order is the expression of the nature 
of ·a perfect absolute in ·which all discords are reconciled. 
-It cannot explain the fact of an evolution in history. 
-Its reiteration that all is part of a perfect whole does not touch the 
real question; namely, v/h~~ should '>a per1Ject whole manifest 1 tself in 
this aamitteuly imperfect finite. 
-Absolutists eitl1er ignore the matter or confess it an insoluable puzzle. 
-'Jhen they try to sh011 how imperfection may enter in to m~ke up a whole tna.t 
is perfect, they admit the justice of li~'s claim to light upon this 
subject; but, speedily reaching their limit, they inconsistently ~ll 
back upon the declaration that for the finite mind to ask for light upon 
this matter is essentially absurd. 
-Monistic Personalism claims to nresent the most rational explanation of evi~, 
error, and sin; for it closes its discussion with the concl11sion that they 
are in themselves rational. 
-It reaches this conclusion solely by definition. 
-This assorted perfection of the absolute is an abstract thing and uoes 
not help solve life's urgent problems. 
-Braul) declare& he vtill not make the smallest attempt to explain the 
origin of evil, error, and sin. 
- This is equivalent to saying th&t he will not make the smallest atte:npt 
to explain evil, error and sin; for evil, error, and sin are nothing 
aside from their origin, anu the whole problem concerning them is the 
question of their origin. 
-Further eviuence that absolutism makes no attempt to explain these 
matt~rs .is seen in tl1e denial of morality to the nbsolute .·and the ad-
mission that if the absolute be moral the whole problem is insoluabla. 
-IJ:onistic.Personalism uefiues moral evil as the con£1ict between the good 
and. the bad. 
·110ral evil is not the conflict between goo<l and bad but the wrong 
tennination of that conflict. 
-1lonistic Personalisr..t is empty of motive and guidance for practicPl living. 
-Bradley's admission of this fact. 
-Taylor's admission of this fact. 
-1IcTaggard's admission of this fact. 
Pluralistic Personalism. PP• 43-•18. 
-Pluralistic Persona:i.isra r.IDiutuins that all agency is personal and that 
there is a plurality of persons. 
-.As ·.1e bring this philof)oplty to bear upon the three crucial facts, \7e shall 
reverse the order in ·ithich Yte have been considering t1~ese facts. 
(a) Pl~:tralistic personalism alone squarec itself ·.vith man's sense of 
age11cy. 
-The conviction of freedom in mau h the central fact in life, and 
the conclusions of speculation will come mort; Elnd more into agree-
lflent as it centors its inquiry u-pon this point. 
(b) ?lurali&tic persoualism alono solves the problem of evil, error, 
ond sin. 
(c) 
-Uonism's position stated uy woy oi contrast: 
-:Uonism holds sin, etc. to be synonyu10ue with incompleteness. 
\Then pluralietic personalism, holding ~ that the possibility 
of sin and error is rooted in t.Jan' s freedom, auds to thc.t the 
assertion that limitation of lrno\lledge and experience must 
issue in many failures it seems to approach very neer to mon-
ism. In reality, ll0\7ever, it does not; for in the monistic 
vie·.v all has been as the absolute would hove had it, while for 
pluralistic personalism all has not been a& the Infinite would 
have had it. 
-l!onism makes taen's sin God's: Leibnitz's illustration of tl:.e 
stream and the batik. llonism looks upon the sin and error as 
deprivation: these problems present, th~n, not a qu8ation of 
quality, but one of quantity. For monism sin and error are 
necessary to the pt~rfect absolute. 
-Upon the hypothesis of personal identity and responsibility all these 
absurdities are avoided. 
-Distinction is rnaue between mist&kes anu sins. 
-Sin is unration&l conduct in the finite.creaturo. 
Pluralistic personalism alone explains the f&ct of an evolution in 
history. 1 
•Imposaible to unde1·stand why an absolute perfection shuuld evolve; 
easy to see why a finite moral agent must evolve. 
-Responsible character is poasible upon diverse stages of culture; 
for it depeud~:u-.)Qn the available truth E.ud the prevailing stan-
dards, but uyon tho individuel's voluntary attitude tov1ard the 
available truth und standarus. 
-It cannot be obj6cted that this would make us indifferent to 
the knowledge of our time: its tt:ndency·is precisely the 
opposite. 
-But why should the stoge of culture be chv.nged for euch t;;ener&tion? 
-The ans·.ver that the ruce is a unit into which each epoch of 
history enturs as tl1e months the life of &n individuLl, is 
an inadequate solution. 
-E~:~ch gtmeration sets the stage for tlm next. leavinG its ·.1ork 
to inspire or warn,- the totul age-long structure of civil-
ization thus s6rving in guiding and inspiring the toilers. 
Conlcusion; PP• 'fJ-lff. 
-:.:an's last rt:Jasoned philosopl1y is identical with his first 
instinctive view. 
-The great need of our day is u repuuiation lllif fatalism. 
-';:his is more uer•rly accomplished upon tLe plane of indi viuual 
life than upou the plane of history. Hegel, by inconsistency 
vlith his o·.m tt:nets, 1Jrovided for indivi<lut,l freedom. 
-IIeeel's conception of history is fatalistic; yet uany who 
rt:ject his philosopl1y as such, accept his interpretation of 
history. 
-Thus the iutel'!lretation of history runs iudifferent to the 
course of ~Jhilosophical de-.relopr.1out. 
7. 
-Hence our contention for &n l•On<:st fllcing or the problem of efficient 
cnusation in llistory, E·nd our foith th£!t such a course will prove at one 
and the same time the t;re&test possible impetus to both philosophical 
and historical pr05Teas. 
Bibliography PP• 49-!30. 
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.. Il~RODUCTGUY UOTE-
The distinction between secondary and efficient causation is widely recog-
nized in the thought of tho modern world. The cere recognition of this distinction 
represents in itself one of the most notable achievements of philosophical inquiry, 
and is in turn, the key to further advance. The study of secondary causeo is alwe~o 
descriptive: it traces and describes, and leads us ever back tcruard the question of 
the real, or efficient cause. In the field or history the subject matter is humen 
conduct; and the study of efficient c&.usation in this field is an inquiry into the 
efficient cause of conduct in tho individual and in sooiet~. Such an inquiry has 
generally been termed the "Philosophy of History." This designation antedates the 
modern distinction between secondary and efficient causation, and consequently is 
often applied in a very loose and inaccur~te sense. Just s s "Uatural Philosophy" 
was formerly used to designate Physics, so the term, "Philosophy of History" \"'Ss 
applied to any thoughtful consid~rntion of historical data. The term is open to 
objection, also, in that it is possible to so dufine it as to bee tho question. 
Hegel does this when, affirming that neason is the efficient reality, he proceeds to 
define the Philosophy of History as t~e bringing of the sim_ple conception of Reason 
to bear upon history; for from such precise it inevitably follows that all historical 
data are rational , and hence necessitated. Efficient causation, on the other hand, 
is a term that is not open to these objections. It is both definite in its meaning 
and free from all assumptions. It clearly indicates a problem without implying the 
least bias toward any one or the possible solutions. 
It is the purposo of this dissertation to set forth, as it exists today, the 
general situation relntive to tl1e study or efficient causation in history. It is 
written with the conviction, first, that we lwve reached a stage of human thought 
which should make possible a clenrer and more intelligent treatment of this problem 
than formerly; and second, thr.t n franl~ facing or it upon the part of historicnl and 
philosophical thinkers would provo at one end the seme time the greatest possible 
impetus to progress in both fields. The best corrective test for a theory of 
causation in history is to apply it to the individual life. Likewise, philoso-
phies of individual life need to be examined in the light of the l&rger problem 
of history to offset their egoiatic tendencies. 
1
1 
This paper attempts, not an exhaustive treatment, but a brief yet oompre-
,·. hensive survey of the fr.ctors entering into the general situation. It therefore 
~~ considers a nwnber of distinct , though convergent lines of thought, end n&turally 
IJ (1 employs much 1mplici t art,"Wl1ent. If 1 t cont~ins the really important factors or 
I the problem and maintains a r~~sonable degree of proportion and unity, the writer's 
l aim will be fully realized. 
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r. A ?LEi;. FOR A C.l:JIDID FLO 117G OF Tlill 
PROB.Lill.I OF EPFICIEl:T CLUSi.TIGlT n; HISTORY-
A- The Problem Cam1ot Be Avoided By The Thinking wind. 
At the very outset, when we nppror.ch tho problem of efficient caussticn we . 
are confronted with the assumption, widely accepted b,y tho modern scientific world, 
that knowledge cannot transcend the phenocenal. This is the fundDmental dictun1 of 
modern Agnosticism. 'I'his pl1ilooophy of knovting and being rests upon t·.7o dicta: 
first, the dogma of Hume thnt \7ha.t is uei ther abstract reasoning concerning quantity 
and number, nor yet experimental reasoning concerning matter of feet or existence, 
can only be sophistry or illusion; and second, the doctrine of Laplace that science 
has no need of the theistic llypothesis. These principles deny the possibility of 
any kn~wledge outside of ascertained fncta as to 4oexistences and successions in 
mind and body. Finite man can kno·,7 and needs to know nothing of efficient causation. 
It is no answer to a rensoned argument to content one's self with raising 
questions about the motives of the arguer, but Agnosticism is not a reasoned argu-
ment : it will always be found to be gratuitous affirmation prompte~ solely by mo-
tives. Sometimes the motive is laziness, it beine decidedly e~sier to cover over 
great quec,tions with tho blanket of agnosticism than to face them in the honest ef-
fort to comprehend them. Not infrequently the motive is immorality, the demand of 
life as it is for laissez fnire, in which case agnosticism beco~es the defense reared 
in vain hope to shut out all that is unwelcome from low planes of thought and conduct. 
Often agnosticism is but a species of insane outcry, hardly to be at ell accounted for 
by anything of rational reotive, a cry from those who have become oboessed by some 
totally inadequate theory of life. neal Agnosticism is to be distinguished from 
frank recognition of nnn's limited achievements. The latter is entirely consistent 
with perennial hope and unceasing effort. The former says nothinc about mat1's achie-
vements : its concern is ·,1ith what men is now trying to do, and its t.Joss~ge is that he 
can never accomplish it. It ®res to pronounce upon the imrnediato and practical 
concerns that press closo upon l1'1lll1lln life from every side. Rebuking the presumption 
J 
J 
l 
in man that emboldens him to wrestle with the problems he finds lying in hie path 
rather than be recreant to hie ovm destiny, Agnosticiem is the very embodiment of 
presumption. To declare of a minu w11ose gre&test characteristic is its eteedy ad-
vance in conquest, that it can 11ot take this step or that atop, must mean, if it 
is to mean anything, that the one so ueclaring ccmprehends the step in question. 
That is the great inconsistency of Agnosticism. How do the AGnostics knaa that 
man cannot kn~ From the primitive Agnostic declaring with all the assurance of 
positive kn~ledge that it is impossible for man to know, on down to the modern more 
scientifically expressed denial of the possibility of knowing anything beyond mater-
ial causes, it is ever and alw£ya this same contradiction.. Agnosticism fails by 
its inherent inconsistency. 
Over agt~inst tl1e Agnostic attetlpt to forestall all inquiry as to efficient 
causation there stand t•.1o considerations uhich cannot be set aside. The first is 
that every step in the tracing of secondary causntion in tho material world tends to 
bring us nearer to tho deeper question of efficient cauaation. It is true that 
scientific inquiry n~ed not call in tho theistic hypothesis to aid it in tracing any 
II. 
particular chain or cause end effect; it can deal with each item of ita investigation 
without definitely raising the c~estion of efficient causation. There is so much of 
truth in Laplace's dictum. lTovertheless, every step taken in tracing the progress 
or a plant in its cycle or of a solnr systom in its evolution foroos more and more 
u-oon the attention the consideration of what is implied in our total kllO"nledt,•ft. Tho 
scientist cannot alunys remcin a mere scientist: his very suocere, continually en~ 
larging tho field of lmowlod{;e, rtdses questions which tend to force him into wider 
spooulaticn. Two epistemological questions inevitobly arise: What ere the limits 
•1 of knowledge? anu mmt is tho nature of l:nowledge? That broatlening eoiontifio 
,j 
'' l.: kno·.vledgo t'oroes such questions, finds historical confirmation in the fact that most 
scientists drift, consciously or unconsciously , into epistemology. Indeed it is 
thie that explains why motlern scitmce ll£s adOiltod n definite philosophy in its alig-
nment with agnosticism. 
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The second consideration is even more significant: it is the decisive proo·t 
that the agnostic is wrong. It is found in the tact that all men, the agnostic includ-
ed, do, as a matter of fact, either think out or accept without thinking, some theor1 
of efficient causation even while dealing with each item of' scientific inquiry. 
They cannot avoid so doing. ~he question of efficient causation is implicitly present 
all the time; and the scientist, though he may be professedly acnostic, attributes 
to the atoms, or· forces under observntion,adequacy to produce the observed results. 
That adequacy covers all tlult is ever meont by the term efficient cause. Thus the 
1 mind, denied the rigl1t to exercise itself' rationally until it roaches finality, blind-
•! 
j ly assumes finalitj in the secondary causes to which it is confined. Even Eerbert 
Spencer adr:lits this when he writes: "though the Absolute cannot in any manner or de-
gree be kno·.vn, in tho strict sense of knowing, yet we find that its positive exi s-
tence is a necessary datum of consciousness; that so long as consciousness continues, 
I 
i 1 we cannot, for an instant, rid it or this datum; and tl1et thus the belief which this 
I 'j j datum constitutes, has a higher wvrrant thsn any other whatever;" and, "the l~oumenon 
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everywhere named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, is throughout necefHl&l'ily thought 
of as an actuality." lFirst Principles, Sterotyped Edition +.'27) In other words, it 
is impossible to think of a phenomenon vrithout holding in mind what is im!)lied in 
thst ·rer:; conception: namel_y' something either be:,rond oxri thin, something which is 
not phenomenal but efficient. 
The impossibility of avoiding the question of efficient causation is thus 
seen even uhen the material world is beinG studied; it is doubly evident when hUI:lOn 
conduct becomes the object of inquiry. ETery iudiviuual h&s his own philosophy of 
ccndilot. \Ji th the masses of uen this philosophy of life 1s inarticulate, but it 1a 
none the less present ss a mouldinG ideal in thought and net. Each h~n baing 
facing the problems of orror and sin nnd suffel'ing and atrum;le in his o-.vn life, r:.r-
rives consciously or unconsciously , at a working philosophy: some reach it thl'ough 
a process of speculation, some through instinct, some throut;h the 11ord or exsmple of 
others. NO".f when we turn to tho study of history ·:1e !:ust 11ko'11ise have a theory of 
~l 
\ 
.I 
:, ce.usation, a working philosophy by ·.1hich to interpret its fncts. 
l 
The theme is the 
l same; namely, human conduct. This is a foot of the grectest importance: the greet 
,I 
j central problems that foce us as v1e raise the question or efficient causation in his-
! 
i tory are preeisely those that ora cantrDl in the problem of our individuEl lives. To 
be sure some questions arise in our incuiry as to efficient causation in history that 
do not pe~ain to the life of the itldividual; but in every instance these exceptions 
, will be found to be of aeconuary importance. 
! 
Any one who has faced the problem of 
his o;vn life and arrived at a i?Orkint; theory- and we. are all included here- has the 
essentials of a philosophy of history; and he will naturlilly apply that life philos-
ophy and interpret history sccording to it. no man csn easily keep the theory which 
he holds of his ~ personal conduct separate and in obeyance when he Qssays to ex-
plain the conduct of humanity. neither does it avail to say that the historian does 
j not aim at an explanation of huoan conduct, but merely at a representation. Though 
I 
. it may be possible to describe n series of physical ot~nees without explaining them 
\ .. otherwise than implicitly, the case is different when ue come to hum&n conduct. Here 
.. our very language begs the quo6tion: it will not yield itself to tho mere H0\7, but 
\ insists upon the \'Thy and \/ho. Yfuen lll[.U writes history," his whole problem is one Of 
l "\7eighing motives and determining responsibility. He must recogni:e thc.t he is part i or hiotor:;; that he helped ""ke it and is LlOkine more or it in hiD daily living; and 
that \VhBtever 1s ".1orth while ill his life is involved in tt.aat making. HonestJ will 
insist that he Judge and oxplnin the past deeds of nations by the same principles 
"hich he applies in judgine Emcl explaininG his oYm deeds oncl those of hi a neighbors. 
As a matter of fact, llouever, many students of both individuLl and social 
concluct~efrain from doing this nr.tural thing. They flatly contradict their o··m fund-
1 smental philosophy when they begin to account for• history. 
1 
Later in the discussion 
l 
1 
I 
concrete illustrations of tl1is:inconeistency will appear; but no~ it is sufficient 
to emphasize the foot that it is juat us natur&l and fecsible to consider efficient 
l! 
H t ~ causation in the field of history as it is to consider it in the field of the indiv-p 
t 
l 
l 
idual life. If it be impossible in tl1e one case it is impossible in the other5 if 
t 
i ·~ its possibility be ~ instinctively asks 
l 
admitted in the one it cannot be denied in the other. The mind 
\lhy? and c~nnot tolerate the checking of its impulse without con-
' ! tradicting its o·.1n nature. 
I j 
l B- The Problem IIae not Doen Avoiued By Historians. j 
'i'urning to the gre&t and more extended efforts that hr.ve been mt.de to portray 
l 
.! the events of hum&n history, i7e sbE.ll seek long and vainly for a historian who he.s 
'\ j succeeded in looking upon the course of events without either avo·.1ing or ll ssuming 
/ some theory of efficient ct.ucetion. The possibility must be edmi tted of treating 
1 1 a brief epoch in such a purely narrative fashion as to leave the reader unconscious 
1 that any question of efficieut cr.usntion has been considered at all; but no one bas 
1 j ever attempted the larger ranb~S of human history without basing his work explicitly 
i ! or implicitly upon a philosophy. Carlyle remarks that "Poetry, Divinity, Politics, 
I 1 Physics, have each their adherents and adversaries: each little guild supporting a 
i 
' defensive and offensive war ror its o;m special domain; while the domain ()f history 
l j is as a l'ree Emporium, v1here all these belligerents peaceably meet and furnish them-
1 l selves; and Sentimentalist aud Utilitarian, Sceptic and Theologian, with one voice 
advise us: examine History, ror it is philosophy teaching by experience." 
In other words, uon being philosophers before they became historians, con-
I tinue to be philosophors ill the interprotion Of the facts or history. ~herefore it 
j is obvious folly to deny in the realm of history the right of definitely flioin~ phil-
} j osophical questions. A weak vacillating indifference to theae questions is li.ke-
l 
1 wise folly. Either such iudiffe1·euce or such deuinl ~Wkes possible the stealthy 
•t 
1 garbling or history to support most contradictory doctrines. James Froude says 
,I 1 that history sometimes had seemed to him like a child's 5~me of lettered blocks 
:j 
.l
1 
·.vhich the historian could nruange so as to spell nn~rthing he chose. Iu Tiew of 
such possibilities, the greatest factor in this whole nstter is the vie·.v point which 
the historian "chooses", the philosophy i1hich prepossesses him and which constitutes 
his ... ~ookQgl· The actual facts or history are as they are, end cnnnot mean contra-
dictory things. The.t they have been so intorpruteu lends us to look behind the 
--------------------------------
1 
! 
narratives and test the relative merits of the opposing philosophies that make them 
l 
what they are. 
I 
I 
I 
c-
] 
I 
Tho Problec Is l1ore Pressing Todny Than Ever Before. 
Progress in every field of l::nowledge evolves through the same steges: first, 
there is the gathering and sifting of facts; t!~n, by induction, the findinG of the 
1 
law or the general principle involved;and, finally by the aid and inspiration of that 
l 
larger principle, the gaining of a new and broader grasp of all the facta. Through 
~ . 
__ the labors of many 11orkers the dcta in the field of history, is now lnrgol;y €;atherod • 
. -~ 
.! 
:New sources will be discovered, aud ne•1 evaluations will be nu:.de: nevertheless, for 
i ~he bulk of history, this work is practically done. The harve:>t from the scientific 
jtudy of history ,1vhich_ characterized the ninteenth century, is beginning to appear in 
-:the collections or sources which are now issuing from the press and which constitute 
J 
' a very considerable part of the total historical publications or to-doy. The time 
t 
,having com~hen the facts are largely determined a~d sifted and uade ready to the his-
!5 
l . 
toriau• a _hand, a ne\7 epoch dawns. The dominant interest must shift from the discovery 
'of facts to their iuterprotntion. 
1 I 
anust no-.7, as never before , receive attention. j 
The la'li, the principle, the philosophy of events 
~ second fact bearing upon the present situation is even more significant-
;the clear cut distinction no\1 generally mnde between the province or science and that 
I 
l tf philosophy. The slightest acquaintance with the history of thought suffices to re-
bind us that this distinction is a decidedly modern achieverllont; the preceding centur-
;j 
ies ring with contested cloims os to the rights and boundaries involved. Philosophy, 
1 
as Studenberg says in his Introduction to Philosophy, "has been made at uifferent times 
I ro include all tlUlt is possible and real in earth, in hetiven, and in imagination." 
,rcience has been equally vague and arrogant in its claims; end durint; tho nineteenth 
(century, disgusted ..-tith the vacillating ·.1oakne6s of philosophy, anti. flushe~ with its 
~own ouocess, its vanity became chronic. Today a bottel' situation oonfronto uo: the 
<COnflict bet·.1een science awl philosophy, prompted nnd maintainod b;r ignorauce, is com-
, ing to an end. Squatter's claims have boen discredited, and both philo~ophy and 
science are loft with undisputed title in the fields of their rightful possession. 
Science deals with facts and seeks to understand how they are ralc.ted to ooch other 
in time and space; philosopl1y raises the qu~stion of the real explanation, the ef-
ficient causation of those facts. 
It is wonderful how many confusions have vanished, and hem many bugbears 
/~. 
have received their death blow through this adjudication and establishment of bound-
ries. It is no longvr possible for a oan ~o betake himself to his closet, and upon 
} the authority of abstract reasons uhich he may formulate, proceed to evolYe and de-
f 
~ 
I 
I 
l j 
I 
1 j 
I 
I 
l 
l j 
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! ·~ 
l 
I 
clare under the name of philosophy rthnt is and ·.ihat is not true,what is and •·1hat is 
not possible in the ·.1orld of nature. ~he day when Uioholas Fuse could in the name 
of the principle of design, arGUe &gaitlst the real existence of newly discovered do-
uble and mutiple stars, the day Tihon E1tler could in the nlime of Providence, inveigh 
against lightning rods, and ·.1hen Dr. llOYtley could battle Ytith similar 1teapons against 
vaccination- that dny bas passed. Gn bhe other hand, no lon~_,-er can physicists e.t-
tribute changes and events to stars, or to nature and natural la.1s, nnu pretend that 
they have thus adequately provided for efficient causation • Some small scientists 
and some small philosopl1ers are still toiling on under the old time confusions, but 
those of them who are not very small inueed, are, at least, in the minority, end, 
in o.ny case, as a class the~r \1111 soon be 'but a memory. 
Witness to the significance of this chnngo ns it applies to the treat-
the methods and insight of ocden1 science. ~hey seek to interpret history through 
psychology. Professor I:arl LaLiprocht, an outstandinG leader iu thit group of writers~ 
declares:" History in itself is uothiug but applied poycholot;y. lienee we must look , 
to theoretical psycholotrJ to give us the claw to its true interpretation." Such a 
ne·,7 and fruitful oethod offers every temptation to arrogant clr.ins, and yElt such claims 
are notably absent. ~he rtri tors of thia school conatnntly respect this clear out 
boundar; betw3en science and philooop1~, and realize thDt they aro dealing ~ith sec-
ondary causation only. 
,] 
<l D-
!l 
The Problem ~hrust Into The Foreground By The 
Development Of Historical Writing. 
In a broad survey of the efforts which nen have rondo through the centuria~ 
to narrate and interpret the story of the htunnn race, a grac.iually changing view-
' point is noticeable- a change from the vie\7point o! the chronicler to that of the 
. philosophical historian. Such a development is discernable in the historical writ-
lings of the classical ·.1orld. There, of course, it is upon a comparatively nsrrow 
~ stage, for classical history had but a few centuries of scope, and was further limit-
ed by its inability to cooprehend the unity of the race. \71th the fall of the Roman 
Empire the direct courses of classic development came to an end, and civilization 
began again in germinnl form in other lnnds nnd among ne\7er peoples. Uithin the 
range of the l:odern \7orld this development in tho treatoont of Historical dnta is 
clear and '1.Ulr.listakable. The historiaus of the Uidd.le i.gee were, in the nain, but 
chroniclers. The facts wore looked upon as history, and 1.:orely to record them ·;1as 
to be a historian. Just as there are no-:l a fe·.1 belDted chroniclers so there \Vere 
in those days a few philo~ophicnl historir.ns. nevertheless in the mass of histor-
ical \7ritings £ln evolution both as to vie-:tpoint and as to method is e&sily traceable. 
',71th the Renaissnnce the clnssic models were revived, and n ne·:1 school 
of historians appeured who were more than mere annalicta. In Italy liachiavelli stands 
at the forefront of this nm·t group of political and llistorical thinl:cra. Spain, 
France, snd England, indeed all countries stirred by the Renaissance, afford evidence 
of the broader historical outlook made possible by the study r.nd imitation of clnssio 
models. The centuries of rnodern history prior to the eightoeuth, ho·.7ever, \71 tness an 
e:zoeedingly slou developoont in historical liternturo. In the ·;1orks that .1ould need l to be tnl,en into account, end they are but frm in n=bor, we begin to meet .lith 
~ innreaoing proctical iutorest in the affairs or everyday life. ?his concrete prac-
an 
1 ticality ia but n uaturol result, r::nue possible ~J tho lleforr.mtion, of the entrance of 
f 
I laymen into the fields of education and literary pursuits. This practical tendency J in historical -.r1t1ng, "hioh bas nome to it• fuller realization only within the nast 
·~ 
I If 
.J 
l. century, thus finds i tG sources in the post-Reformation period. The choicest early 
j illustration in English literature is found in Sir \!alter Raleigh's History of the 
horld, in '.that IJr. Eggleston terms "his delightful pariculari ty". 
~· 
\/i th the coming of the eighteenth century this ne'i7 regard for life in the 
concrete receiveu n tJighty impetus nud expressed itself eloqueutly in t\70 new forms 
or literature- the perodical anu the novel. ~he fact that groupe of gifted novel-
lists anu essayists apueared simultaneously in almost every European country, i6 e 
Jphenomenon comparable to the \Wnderful development of sculpture in the Periclean l .. ge, 
or of drama in the Elizabethan Period. 
By the middle or the century the remarkable display of genius in the field 
, of the essay and the novel, which hnd signalized the opening decodes, ".'las paralleled 
, by an equ&lly remnrkable wealth of genius in t:r.LSt of historical writing. The day of' 
the mere chronicler, and even the day of the mere narrator in v1hose stirring· n;.rrative 
.. everything takes ploco, ns in a fairy tnle, without adequnte cause, has no'.V definitely 
. passed. The day of the li ternry historian has cor.1e. At the forefront of the illus-
trious band stand Voltaire, IIume, Robertson anu Gibbon. Gibbon's monumental history 
· of the Roman Bmpiro stands to this dny, in the final estioate of the majority of ori-
tics, as the world'e greatest historical masterpiece. The later discov~red sources 
and the results of the scientific t€JSting of former data have made it necessary to 
. supplement Gibbon at r.lfiny points, but he will probDbly never be superceded. He 1a ,, 
·I 
' 'the Shakespeare of historical \7l"iting. His enduring faoe rests upon a rare combina-
tion of marvelous memory and vast learnins by Which he gathered and held the fccts of 
thirteen centuries of civilization, ~ith an unparalled artistic senbe in the grouping 
of huge masses of dotoil, and a style ·.1hich in its stateliness and balance is pecul-
iarly fitted to this immanse array of mvrshnlled facts. He is open, of course, to 
some cri ticisJJ, the grentest of ·,rhicll is thtlt his imagination d•tells upon r!IO terisl 
crandeur more than upon elevated chnrDctor. or this group Voltaire deserves especial 
credit for his grasp of universal history,- John Fiske giving it ar his·verdict that 
in thi~:~ rrlspect ho surpassee even Gibbon. But .1hat ·.re are here concerned especially 
1 a 
·.ro note is the application in this group or historians. or tho highest literary 
.talent to the portrt.yal of the events and scenes of history. With the exception 
i 
;bf Gibbon and Voltaire this ·.ms their chief and in most inatauces, judged in the 
l 
·r·· ight of present day standarus, their only merit. 
· With the dD>mlug of the nineteenth century two growing tendencies 1f,7ell the 
1 
.tide thot raises history to still hit;hcr levels; namely, more scientific rmthods of 
ketting at tl1e facts, _&nU. still greater shifting of· interest from politics to people. 
1 
lio one name cr.n be fixed upou as deserving credit fer these clmnges: efforts to in-
ldi t th ibl h · t t adi t rcsul ts. John Stuart J oa e e one respontJ e person ave t;l von moe con r · c ory 
~~.!ill says that ·,7e owe this development to ~ir i'/hltor Scott and his historical novels; 
l·'hile David Churchill J:ing gi veo Herder the credit. ~he importont thi"l! is tbll t the 
.;chnnges came, and that mauy cont1·ibuted toward their coming. In the development of j . . 
lmore scientific methods Herder, Iaebuhr, aud Fanke wore the outsts.nuing leauers. They 
Ja·,7Skened a great ne·.1 interest in orit;inal sources, enu laid the foundation for a juut-
jer valU8Uon of varioue types of hietorical testimony. Efficiently tr•ined in tOO se 
lne-.7er methods, a splenllid eroup of hiatorieua- Thierry, IIallam,.nankEJ, ~:<n<l Ilichelet-turned a· . .,ay from courts aud battlefields to investi&~te the life of the people ond tr..e real sources of humnn culture. They combined literary oerit v1ith the strictest ac-
curacy. Under their hands the course of oivilizaticn stood so clearly and justly 
·• depicted as to compel n vlider acceptance of the idea of progress in histor:r· Indeed 
jtheir work greatly aided in preparing the way for the broed generalization of Evolution 
l 
' ..vhich was even then taking allape in the mind or the aso• Carlyle follo·.7a the saoe 
I 
path is his treatroout of tlw French Revolution. Guizot carries these tendencies to 
still wider application iu his greet History cf Civilization, and the publication 
of th::lt ·.tork may justly be looked upon as tho olimnx of this period • 
.As thel'llind trc.cea the cousal counection in hu.rnsn hiutory, it is driven 
step by step to·.1ard tho c1ucstion of officiont causnti on. This larger comprehension 
of the course of human events Hhich was gaine4o~·mrd the close or the eighteenth 
century inevitably thrua~hie question to tho front. r,7e see the proof of this in 
l the numerous philosophies of hif;tory nhich DpDeared. 
l 
~he sub.iect challeneed and 
'1 
,, 
engaged the greatest minds. Tho problem m•s not cle&rly defined, as we l1avo pre-
I douely noted, and in consequence rnuch that was written fell short of tlJe ref,l issue, 
1 J 
occupying itself merely in a tracing
11
secondary causation. ~ong the most valuable 
Jl, terial bequethed to the world by that period sre tho \1orks of Herder end Hegel. 
In a sketch of the development of historical wri til1g tl:e next chapter would 
deal with the great "scieuco of history'' conflict Ylhich raL"'d during the middle portion 
oJ the nineteenth cent-ury. As in tho eighteenth century the larger comprehension of 
tJe course of civilization issued in a period of philosophical specul~tion upon tho 
l 
content of History, so the still larger outlook upon the unity of history and tho pro-
Jess or the race which broke over the world in the second quarter of tl1e nineteenth 
•1ntury forced men anew to a similar inquiry. !11atoriana, al,.aya philosophers, con-
fessed more fraukly than at any time ~efore,and plunb~d into a controversy as to ef-
~~ciant causation. The mntorialistic philosophy wa• put for>mrd es tho sola and the 
adeou:::te nhilosophy of history. It '.lill be our task to discuss the r:1eri ts of this I . -
contention in a lator section; it suffices ua l1ere to notice it as one more illustration j ~ the fac~hat every step in tho progress of historical treotment appro~ohee &nd sets 
1J plainer relief this inevitable queati011 of efficient causation. 
1 
Since that controversy died am:.y, the streams of tendency in the: historical 
t eld are many and complicated. In the mnin historians occupy themsolYes with inten-
i 
a1ve scientific study of isolated periods. On the other hand, ho·:tever, the conecious-
·1•• of the unity of history and the certainty of pro[l1"esa were never before so atront;• 
Under the light of this conociousnoss the detailed '070rk muot stsnd fo1·th, not as tho 
1 
end .itself, but merely au tr.u meDne- 1 t but preperoa for the lar~,;er grasp and conception, 
f 
II. THE CRUCU.L POI!r73 OF THL PRCBL:L:.l-
In a study of efficient causation in history there emerge three points 
around which the inquiry must largely center. They stand closely related, and any 
one of them, viewed in its larger implications, might eaaily be made to comprehend 
the others; but, in spite of this possible overlapping, their separation distinctly 
aids in comprehendin~ and discussing the one central ra&tter. It shall be our pur-
pose here to point out these crucial points of the problem and to discuss briefly • 
their implications. 
A- Tim IDI'J.. OF PIWGP.ES:J-
The first matter to challenge the deeper thcught or the historian as he 
handles hie materials is the idea of pr06'Tess. This idea itself is a complex one; 
much or little may be read into it. In ita broadest denotation it includes the 
thought of a goal and, thus, as \70 shall point out, iliplies the idea of final onus-
a.tion; in its narro'ier denotation it may be stripped to the bare idea of moveoent or 
... 
chnnge. Tho term itself" in its development is a good illustration of tl1e idea it 
sets forth; it first appears as the simplo idea of change, snd moves on through the 
centuries to the fuller conception generally held today ;vhen we sp£JDk of human pro-
gress or advancing civilization. The modern student or history finds this idea upon 
the very surface as he approaches his study; he must grapple with it~ implic~tions 
in any serious effort to explain history, and as he does so he will discern that tho 
deepest speculation upon the t:JOL-ning or history co1mot got. beyond tlle. necessity of 
still dealing ;7ith these same it.lplicutious. Likewise primitive man in his first 
efforts to comprehend tho mooning of history, found his inr.uiry coutored upon this 
same concept. though in 1tu siupler form. Thus whetle r logically or chronologically 
considered, this ideo of prot,-rosl3 is the first llllltter to challen(,"' the mind in ita 
efforts to explain history ndoquutely. 
mem=rrnrmnrsrssr::rm F !1!2L!4 
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The simplest and most essential thout,;ht in this concept of progress is thLt 
of the coming to pass, the happening of events. The ides of a goal and a move-
ment of events toward it is, as yet, a lou£; •1ay off:'that is alone the product of an 
outlook upon a broad si1eep of events and lnature reflection upon their nanning. At 
the first, history presents itself to the mind merely as a series of events. Cer-
tain things occur "w7hich attract man's attention and lint;t:r in his memory. They fur-
nish the need and become the occasion of man' a first li tersry endeaYors; but not be fore 
they have prompted him to philosophical speculation. The question of efficient 
causation is implicit in these events, and man is under the necessity of explaining 
them as best he may. The nature and worth of man's earliest doctrine of c~usation 
we shall consider in a lator section. 
It is worth observing that in the riSe of metaphysics as applied to the in-
animate ·.vorld, we h8ve a close pt.rallel tc this beginning of speculation in the fi:eld 
of human events. There, as bore, tho first matter to challenge deeper thought was 
, the notion of change, of becoming. When thr.t concept emerged, metnphysics vms born. 
The Eleatic and Heraclitic Schools ceutereu their in<:uiries upon this point. 
The lflrger idea of prob-ros.s ns implying n goal, a move1nent of events on·.vard to-
ward a better or cOI:Ipleter stage, is a more or less gradual product of the ages. Todey 
it is one of the outstanding convictions of the race. As to the mnm1er in which this 
• progress is best conceived, lilld as to the test by which its ·.vorth is most adequately 
determined, men have widely differed, but, as to the recob"lli tion of the feet, tl1ey 
bave come more and more into Df,'Teenont. 
It might seem but a us.tura.l product of conceit thnt vuy generatic.n should es-
toem itself more advauceu thc.n its predecessors. Such, ho·:tcver, is not. the explan&tion 
of this conviction of progruss, for it hlla menifestly erown by insight, incrt::D"'inmhe 
passing centuries; its end, nlao, is in keeping with its origin, for it does not tend, 
· in its total influence, to aur;nent pride, but to a'.taken a humbling sense o_f responsi bil-
o1 7'"op·e..~s 
ity. This conviction,.[inda expression in tbo phra£::e, "In the fullness of time." Events, 
truths, principles hnve come into huwan ex,1~rieuce in somethill.l; of oruerly, proeressivc 
fashion. The greet things did not come upon the scene all in a dDy vnu unheralded; 
; \ 
• 
fj 
i
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each day was fashioned in the ~omb of·a yesterday. This oonviotion of unity in the 
course of civilization and of an evolution in its gradual gro·.1th is the outstanding 
truth that inspires and directs the thought of the modern world. 
It would be going beyond the fr-ets to assert that this idea or rrogress in 
its fullest sense, is universf.illy held. IJany flatly deny that events are moving onward 
toward better things. lt is not necessary for us here to enter into the merits of 
this controversy, for even upon the supposition that this dominant thought of the 
modern ·.1orld is erroneous, and. that there is no pro~ess in the larcer sense of tlle 
~ord, there yet remains the fact that events have corne to pass, and, as we have point-
ed out, that bare fact demands explanation and pushes the Dind to the depths of phil-
osophical inquiry. 
It remains to be pointed out, however, that this concept in its larcf.:r me~ning, 
as it presents itself to the 1,1odt=rn student of history, is far richc:r in its I!lEinifest 
philosophical implications than i~ the bare notion of the occurence of isolated events. 
There is in it, as we have nlreGdy suggested, the thought of a goal, an ulitmate end 
toward which events are moving. But such a thought is teleological; it raises at 
once the whole question or final causation. We cannot think of a GOal, au end to-
ward .,.lhich events move, ·.dthout speaking ano. thinking of a purpose E:nd n purposer. 
Thus this modern conviction of progress thrusts us ~el~on ta~ard- the end of our spec-
ulative interpretation, for it forces us to a consideration or yurpose, and to an iu-
terpretation of our data by the supposition of an intelliGent, personal cause. 
Tho philosophical it1plicat1ons of this idea of progress are rurtller seen if 
·.1e coneider hovl the inte11>rotor of history is constantly forcod back to an interpro-
tation or it • He may dieavo;7 ony philosophical intention, but, so surely_ as he TWkee 
this idea his f;Uiding concept, he will be driven back to the thing he dieuVO"/Be If 
he is cons1de:o:-ing the ju~tice of tho lot of any individu.sl life or Gl·oup or people 
and the problem of such an individual or group living a real and worthy life in the 
environment in -.1hich it finds 1 to elf- anu does not tho discussion of thi e theme con-
sti tute the mass of our litarature ;Jhetlwr in the realt1 of puotry, or fiction, or 
economics, or religion?- he is forced into the comparison of col1kl'.lporaneous and 
;2(JJ 
I . 
historical enviromnents, and into the discussion of tlJoir bearinG upon the individ'lial 
and his possibilities. Should he lean, in this discussion,t o the view that the au-
preme interest is the individual, and that the Ell vironment is but a setting in which 
a life is to find itself m1d come to its ~H.n, he cannot avoid the query why this set-
ting should be alike tor uo tv1o individuals and alike for no two generations. Should 
he try to think of a race in its unity as the hi€jher reality, be still faces the puz-
i:le: \7hy is it necessary for this abstr!lct humanity to go throush such a tortuous 
U.''lfOlding as tho records of tho race actually represent? Uor does he a"foid this 
question '.7hen he settles bnck into his particular in-herited or chosen view or ef-
ficient causation- it follows him theTa and, regardless of what particular type of 
philosophy his may be, he finds himself Ullder the necessity of applying it to the 
elucidation of this question. For instance, if he is a materialist and posits an 
eternal, caterial, uecessitated stream of chane-e as the all in all, the query still 
arises: ·,1hy does tlle stream take this particular course ·.1e see? On a materialistic 
basis a theoretic aus·.1er is reauily at hanu, namely, because it rmu;t. But that by no 
means closes. the matter, for, to be finally triurilphant materialism must onswtJr to 
life's concrete neeus, an~ satisfy life's interests, and prove that in its vie~ is 
. 1 provided the largest, snnest field and atmosphere for all that hut18ni ty holds dear. 
~in, in the creed of the abplutist, another order, higher than anything we 
kn071, is called in, and we oro told that in that unkno·.'IU and unknowable order all 
that seems contradictory to us in our sphere is reconcileu and hnrmoni::ed: an Ullkno·.vn 
is called in to explain the known and to explnin it in an e.llmittodly un1:nowable way, 
And yet that does not cnu tl1e matter: life insists, since it must go on living in this 
finite order, that it be e:;iven help now and here. And absolutists, in their very 
attempt to eho;7 how 11e can ouu do have some insight into why this absolute is as it is, 
admit the justice of lifo's claims, .thO'.lt;h immediately thereafter, n.ving very speed-
ily reached the liLli ts or their ability to sho·.? how their view tleets huw1n needs, 
they invariably GO on to nsoert it to be essentially an absurd thing that the finite 
should demand light on theao things. So caterialiam, absolutifln,- eny I>11losophy we 
adopt,- must finally ana',7or this 4uery in tonne of concreto life; ancl lifE' a real_ 
MMW"'!'S"' 'S[z 5 
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interests constitute the la~fully impaneled and fully qualified jury which is to pass 
upon the merits of tho answers given. 
B- TE ?r~El!CE OF EVIL; T::HROR, J.l;:i) SIU IU IUJI.ll.U LIP:::. 
The darker side of h't.llilCn experience constitutes a second crucial point in the 
problem of history. Life lacks uui ty;- it presents the spectacle of contradiction ond 
conflict. The "becoming", the "perpetual flov1, 1' which challenged msn to his first 
philosophical speculation is soon recognized as anything but an easy, harmonious pro-
cess,- it is a struggle between contrary forces. This darker side ct' hu:nan experience 
presents three aspects: in the field of onterial forces it presents us with the pro-
blem of evil; in the realm of intellect, ·.1ith the -problem of error; and in the domain 
of conscience, ':ti th the probletl of sin. Eoch of these aspects merits a furthor word 
of exposition. 
1- The presence of evil in nnture. 
IJan is born into a world of mighty forces. Their origin and their mean-
ing are left for mnn himself to deterraine as best he csn. Tho problem is insistent 
in its challenge, for these forces play about him and touch his life on every hand • 
.And yet the problem is not simple, for these forces seem to fight against each other-
:some seem apparently p1·omoting his health and happiness, others underrnining all his 
cherished intercGts. Furthurmore, even those that seem friendly are f1 tful nnd treoo h-
erous:- the cooling breeze bocoues a hurricnne, tho refreshing rnin a deluge, tl•e wel-
corned sunlight a ·.vithtlring hent. John Stuv.rt r.an dwelling upon this aspect or h11m.n 
\ 
, exnerienco in his Essays Upon Relision {pp 29-31) writes: "Ii~ture impales men, bresks 
; them as if on a wheel, cnsts them to be devoured by .1ild beasts, burna them-to death, 
;crushes them with stones like tho first Christian liartyr, sterTee them with hunger, 
j 
! 
freezes them -;ti th cold, poisons them by the quick or alo·.1 venom of her oxhnlations, 
and hae hundreds of other hideous uentha in reserve such as the in6'tm1ous cruelty of a 
!1abis or a Domi tian never vurpnssed." llon comes upon tho scene, wailint; in the throes 
or birth, struggles end toils smid life's drudgeries, and ainl~s a·.-n..y in the agonies of 
death. 
2- The fact or error in hUI!lBn thought-
Corning to the plnne of r.JSn'a thougl!t life a fE-et even more insistent in 
its challenge to one considering tl1o oeaning or history presents itself; namely, the 
presence of error. True, in moot things men think alike; coneqquently there is an 
imnressh·e unity in the thought or tho race. This rnEtkes possib:l.e co!Il!.nmicbtion be-
tween minds, organized society, r:ud a growing stock or kno•tledge. If it were not 
for some co!Il':lon intellectual endowment, some likeness of mental constitution, none of 
these things could be. ~nd yet this unity is not all embracing; there is s lao die-
cord, men think differently upon much that affects their lives. Any adequate e~lan-
at ion of the r:J.eaniug or human history must throw light upon this problem (.If error. 
~- The problet.t of l>toral evil-
Turnint; from the survey of naturt::~ nnd its course and from the consider-
ation of mind and its opinions to the field of man's purposes sud e.ctious, ··•e are con-
fronted '07ith a series of facta still more insiftent in their challenge- the .darker 
facts of man's moral life. Part of ~n'o end~vnent consists of a moral consciousnes~ 
discerning between gooc.l. and ovil, approviuc the one anu coudez:miur; tho othc.r, and 
urging the good as obligatory in ccnuuct. Dut man has uot al·mys lived up to tr.e 
dictates of his conscience, and hence his moral lifo prt:sents a discord even surpass-
ing the discord of hif' uentnl life or that or his physical environment. 
I:o\v these three problems aro as old an the x· ace, t.nd yet,they prose 
ane-n and ·vith increasing urt;ency upon each succeedint; generation. T:t;ere was a day 
; when superficial optimism could hold the field, but that dhy passed. Schopenhauer 
:and Hartman brought it to vn end. "?eaeimism," as Professor Flint hns said,· "like 
I 
· !.:acbeth, has murdered Eileep." ~he mouorn world hns o e tronc;t}r senee of the renl and 
universal presoncu or evil than had tho past. Its tem~er cannot be said to be one of 
pess irni am, but on the othor llllnc.l, it oortn inly 1 s not the optirniGm or the fonaor day 
, \1hich could prove sylloghticully thti.t this is the best possible uorld, and then make 
·lit;ht of all that soer.1od to oontrnuict its pl(;l:a.:ing hypothesis. Tho tom "1!el1orism", 
• implying a consciousness or defect couplec.l with a faith in the possibility oncl 
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obligation of i::ll)rovemont, expresses, · bettt;,r than <loes ei thor optioism or pessimism, 
, 
; 
the spirit of the modern world t0\7ard life. 
0- -Tlill COINIC~:WlT OF i.GI:liCY i.Im FREEOO:U DHTi.T~ Dr l:iuT-
By the consideration of evil in nature, error in hUI!I!?.n thougl1t, r,nd sin in 
human conduct, we are thrust deeper and deeper into the proble!n of history; the inner 
citadel is roached when i7e lire dri von to account for the conviction of freedom and 
agency innate in oan. lj,lhe wri tiug of history is but s.n effort to explain hur.1Bn con-
duct: the historian in hio uarration of conduct, cannot nvoid the queetion of respon-
sibility; and here iu man'u sense of responsibility iS the crucit.l fuct of the ·.1hole 
situation. A doctrine of efficient causation in history must e:x:plnin it, r.n~. in 
harmony with ito explanation of this central matter, go on to explciu the efficient 
c~usation of lnunan purpose &nd action, of human thought in its waverings end contra-
dictions, and of nature in ito action end influence upon h'.li!lan life. 
.Ill THE TBllEE POS!JIBLE THEORIES OF l!FFICIJ.JIT CkU3i..TlGli-
An investigation of tho fundamental Tiewpoint of historical wri tinge would 
do much to compel a recognition or two significant facts. First, it would be clear 
that every historical writer would gain much by frankly examining his oc.•tn f\mdarnenta 1 
philosophy, for· his work would tlJ.ereby grmv more thoughtful and consistent. The first 
requirement in any building enterprise is the presence of a plan in the mind of the 
architect. Given the pl&n, the materials may readily be gathered and assembled; 
but, without the plan, a rubbish heap is the utmost possibility. Just so in the 
field or historical writing the great factor is not the host of words, nor the bril-
liancy of style, but the system of principles by which the writer explains historical 
events and interprets human life. Second, the investigntion would prove that only 
three theories of efficient couHation in l1istory are possible,- Pluralistic Personal-
ism, :uaterialism, and lltonistio Personalism. There is room within each of them for 
considerable variation of ottiphasis, but it is impossible to imv.gine any theory thBt 
is not already included in one or the other of these three vie·:1s. 
'Je have already discussed the proposition that the historian needs a def-
inite philosophy upon which to base his v;ork, and it will receive furth~r emphasis in 
the clcsing section; we shall now consider tl1e three theories of efficient ceusation 
in history statin~ them concisely in their typical modern form. 
Pluralistic Persont.liam holds, a.s tho nar.1e aptly indicotee, that all efficient 
agency is personal in its nature, and that history is the resultant of the working of 
an Infinite ':fill and finit~ \7ills. Ita problems, both practical aml theoretical, oen-
ter around the question of tho relationship between thea& finite persons and this 
Infinite Person. b. substential ond r~al frEtedom of >?ill is affiroed o+he creature, 
and r...aintainod as the only s oul·uw grounu upon which it is possible to build character. 
Uoral ovil and error are thus accounted for as the irl"Eltionrl couduot of the creature. 
Impersonal nature serves both as the sceue, or stoee, for cree.turoly existence and a 
medium or divine oomaunication and discipline. 
On the othel' hand, materialism holds tlw.t ell efficient agency is i~rsonal. 
: llatter is supreme; minu is but an accompanying manifestation. The sense of hurosn 
agency and freedom is a delusion; all is held in tho grip of naturnl lavr s.nd necess-
ity. 
In place of this irnperson&l law, llonietic Person&lism or .Absolutism finds 
ultimate reality in one underlying, all-inclusive Self. This ~bsolute expresses 
itself, objectifies itself, gives itsolf the spectacle of all the finite order. 
The finite selves are tbe expressions of the emotions and the uill of the Absolute 
Self: "they exist because he h1:1a a neture such tl!at it must express itself in these 
1 unique ways". ("The i}f:lrsistent Problems of Philosophy"- Calldns: p 440). Hegel 1e 
the most prominen~ exponent of this moue of interpreting history. 
These three philosophies of life stand to each other in certain clearly 
rnsrked relations, whether considered logically or chronologically. For instance, 
the philosophy which il3 nntive "t!O primitive, unreflecting mon- found aliko whether 
one studies history or biobraphy, the raca· or the individual- is Pluralistic Per-
sonalism. IJB.n naturally feels that he hiraself is an agent, &ud that others are ag-
ents like himself. ~i~sm is his philosophy and his religion. He explains the 
phenomena of nature as the acts of ct:pricioua wills docinatinc objocts and natural 
forcos. lie thus accounts for trees, rooks, streams, all, as he accounts for tim-
self, all aro free ag8nta. But it is note worthy that his anioism crows out of 
his conviction that he hi~solf is an agent: he merely projects his inner philosophy 
into the external ·aorld, explonin~ all activity as he explains his omt. 
By this !Jhilosophy he thinks and worships. \'lhether his fE•ith, from the 
first,peesea thruugh and comprehends the one Grer•t Spirit, or whether such com-
prehension only comes latvr, is a debE:ted quostion, but one that does not vitally 
concern us here. \7iuer experience leads the mind from An1misi:l Uy a grvdunl denial 
ot free ~ill in tl!eso obj~ots anu forces. lian' s conviction of his own l)&rsonal 
agency is pressed upon by an over growing number or objects and forces thut hE:.ve 
been stripped of such -pretensions. In the fuca of this ne·.1 aitu~tion the heE:rt 
clings tenaciously to its altoro, ond seeks to bend reason to the defence of the 
thing the.; t i,s not. The old gods 11 ve in poetry after they hr.ve been bnniehed from 
1
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philosophy and history. But if renson be true to itself- as it finally must be- it 
·• 
will refuse to be a hireling pleader and ·;1ill rota in its rightful place in the ju-
dicial chair. 
It is readily seen h0\1 the struggle between reason and the heart mt..y result in 
a complete denial of personal agency. linn rr£iy conclude, since there is no direct per-
aonal agency in the storm and the sunshine, that there is none any71here, not even in 
himself. Thus impersonal nature, in its widening domain as animism cruobles before 
science, is alone declared to be efficient agency, and personality is ueclared to be 
but a manifestation of iropersonul nature's ceasless ongoing. There is no God or 
Maker of things to whol'!l Man c~n lift his heartJ and he is himself but a flesh- and-
Dlood automaton. Uatural lnvt is the one controlling force in the world· In such a 
Tiew a ne·.1 philosophy of human life appears; l!e.terialism is born • 
.Although this philosophy is not modern, yet its greatest battles were fought 
in the nineteenth century. Uith tl;.c great advancement of science which follo71ed upon 
the general adoption of the inductive roethod of study, llaterialism vms thrust for-usrd, 
with an unprecedented confidence, as the fincl philosophy. 'i.'he tide of t:aterialistic 
thought reached its high wctE:r L1llrk in the science of history, ccntrov(;rsy bE:twre n 
1650 and 1665. .d.ugu.ste Comte, Henry Thomas BucklE: and Herbert Speucer ·.1ere the great 
auvocates of the materinliatio interpretation of history. l~ore frr:nl~::.y than at any 
other period the historians of thnt oge ndzni tted th&t they vtere philosophers anci plunged 
into a discussion of funda~eutal beliefs. nuokle used the figure of n ladder to de-
scribe historical atuay,- tho firat run6 ia Observation, the next Discovery, anQ the 
third and hit;hest is Philosophical I:.:ethod; he argued that \1i thont philosophical method 
and synthesis, special investi(,"fltions end discoveries •;Jere oftun most misleading. 
liiehsche is the latest advocr.<to of l.mtcriillisrn es the true philosophy of history. 
We shall touch upon his "biolC.Jgical ut;otism" in the next section, and point out that 
·it is the inevitable conclusion to be drlun from tho prenlisea lai<i uo-:m by his mid-
oentury predecessors. 
Pluralistic Personflliom and l!aterialism are sundered ae fr.r as the zenith 
and the nadir. A. third ·;ie·.l, however, is polleible fmd esrly m:>.nifests itself, namely-
Monistic Personalisu or Absolutism. In its logical relations it stands, in some of 
its leading aspects, as a OOIIlprOL'liae vie·.t, though it can, perhaps, herdly be sl:o':Vtl te: 
have had ostensibly such an origin. It provides for example, ou the one hsud, for the 
necessity involved in Materialism, anu l1olda on to personality 6n the other. It as-
serts one supreme causality, embracing ull th6t is, and reconciling all apparent con-
tradictions in its higl1er harmony. 'i'lhen the religious consciousness is hard pressed 
b,- materialistic philosophy, it has naturally tended to lean toward .Absolutism in at-
tempted defenee. Under such circumstances the religious consciousness seizes upon 
and holds to an ideal of Perfection, and insists upon interpreting Nature deductively 
through that ideal. This finds illustration in Plato, especially as applied to natur(j 
and the material order. Plates' tevching concerning the perfection or the material 
order Liebni tz applies to life as :tell, and asserts this to be the best possible world. 
Hegel is the greatest exponent of this philosophy;and as ·.ro shall lEltor observe, his ap-
plication of it to history is quite gen~rally accepted, thuueh inconsistently, by .ven 
those who reject his philosophy in ita essential contentions. 
Any effort, like tho preceding one, to point out the historical relatione exist-
1ng between contending vieY1s will at once impress some minds oa tending to bias ~he 
reader's Jullgment or to beg the issues that ought to be determined only after all the 
ar~unents are heard. This objection, hcwever, ib unsnrr~nted. 'Z'he thinking world to-
day is generally clear in its a~eement that the geuf::lsie orhifltory of an ideD~is no 
final measure of its worth. Such a history ueUf-'llY h8s inte~:eat and value in itself, 
but such interest and vnlue must be looked for in othf::lr directions thDA that of worth-
determining argument. 
lV. THE TliREE l'O~SIDL3 VID.lS T3STED BY TIC T!ilu:E CRUC.IJ.U. F.i~CTS-
'.'le have contended that the discussion of the problem of efficient causation 
in history must largely center about three points: namely, t1Je idea of progress; the 
presence of evil, error, and sin in human life; and the conviction of agency and tree-
do::t innate in man. ;re have argued thnt the lJOssible theorieE of efficient causation 
in history are three in n"-lJllber: nnmely, Pluralistic Personalism; llaterislism; end 
llohietic Personalise or Absolutism. It shall be our purpose no·,y to test these thrtre 
vie-.vs in the light of those crucial facts. 
Up to this point in the discussion the method has been lsrgoly one of ex-
position. The aim has been to set forth the problem as it lies before the thinking 
mind. Doubtless the type of :philosophy held by the reauer will have !D methins to do 
with his accepting or rejecting certain of the considerntions wl1ich hav~ been offered. 
The bulk of the exposition, l1owever, oan be equally concurred in by readers of all 
philosophical schools. The place in the discussion has now bee~eaohed, though, whore 
exposition must give way to direct argumentation. rte shall contend that Pluralistic 
Personalism offers the oul~theory of efficient causation adet;ue;te to oxplr:in thofacts 
of history. We shall discuss th~ three po&siblo theories in the reverse order or their 
il'!Iportance; Uaterialism, IJonistic Personalism, Pluralistic Personalism. Tho elm, in 
harmony with the former sections or tl1e paper, is to present, not an exhaustive treat-
ment, but a brief survey of the mDin lines of the argument. 
A- IJaterialif1m-
J!aterialism faces history with the affirmation that ell humDn phenomena 
are directly traceable to imporsonal nuture. It is one thing thus to affirm that 
life, thought, ·;irtue, vice, uJJbition, love, all ere but the kaleidoscopic aspects 
of eternally existent matto1·; it is Lnother thin~ to sho-n tho connections, trace 
the relations, and clearly dmnonstrc.to thut by this hypothesis life resolves the 
greatest pocsible number of it& difficulties and conserves the greatest possible 
number of its inttJresta. To tht.f primitive mind the world is but the play ground of 
capricious wills, chaotic in their la·.11esauess. Hv.mvn thought begins its march of 
conquest by the gradual reduction of such a world to order and la~. Step by step 
natural objects and forces are disenchanted, &nd events are laid br.re in their causal 
relations. And, in the main, the process is an ovarturnine of the false cl~ims of 
persons and spirits and wills to rulership, and a· recognition of the objects and forcES 
ot nature as real factors in the uorld. It is an easy matter thence to eoncludethat 
all personal agency is delusive, and that material objects and forces are alone causa-
tive. Such is the assumption of ~terialism. 
\lith all personal agoncy ruled out, and nothing but matter to work from or with, 
or to be accurate, with nothing but matter to do the ·.1ork- let us see ub.at progress can 
be made. ~e are quite Justified in assuming the eternity of matter, for upon any con-
ceivable hypothesis of life, something must be thought of as ~elf-existent. But be-
fore we can conceive of matter at work, we find ourselves under tho necessity of as-
su:ning motion. It will not do to affirm a beginuins of motion in matter previously 
void of it, for then we would be helpless to explv.in the causality of this motion. We 
must affirm its eternity. ',/e now h&ve t\IO assumptions instead of one. \'le are, however, 
a little nearer to our object of sho7ing how all that is, ceme to boi but it is worth 
while to keep our eyes upon the fact that OUT progress is possible solely because we 
have bodily carried a little more of tlie world back into that allege~ beginnine. ~tter 
n~ gets to work by the aeency of its force. Ue have multitudes of moving,elnshing, 
atoms. That is the spectacle bacl;: there; out here in our actual universe, \7e have at-
oms moving in unity nnd order. How can we sho.1 thDt this unity end order emerged from 
that formless chaos? Again ouly by assuming that tendencies to unity snd order inhere 
in matter. \1i th such an assumption added to our othor t\'10, ·.tr:; are om~ bled to push out 
.,_.,e are soon face to fllce, ho·.1aver, -:tith other unexplained fects. 'llhere is 
sentient lifo: ho;·1 uid it come to bo? On the face of acceptud scientific beliefs it 
~ould not possible havo been eternnl, for it could not hnve survived the nebul9 r heat. 
There would seem to be but t·.to ways out- either to reject the nebult,r hypothesis or to 
adoot a theory of spontaneous 6~neration. Reoourco to thu former vie-.v woul+~ise a 
de~nd fer an explanation of cosmic history; recource to the theory of spontaneous 
generation, even grnntius thut lt.boratory proof of its correctness \1ere available-
{ and anyone .who 'bases mu.ch argument on the assumption that such evidence will never 
be possible, may live to see all his argument crumble in a dey)- would lesve the real 
causality or the case untouched. Life tl1ere ·is, and we l'iluat account for it; anu the 
materialist is helpless to do more than add it to his collection of assumption&. 
':. There lies within the sweep of these four assumptions- matt(lr, motion, tendencies 
to unity and order, and lifo- all of the visible order up to the borders of consciousness. 
Beyond that bcrder stand the great interests of' life end history. Before we test the 
adequacy or materialistic philosophy in 1•espect to these interests, ·;1e may peuse to 
note that every step of the materialistic philosophy thus far has been successfully 
challenged by metaphysical criticism. Its assumptions will not beE-r investi&'1ltion: its 
notions of matter, force, snd l£m nre pure abstractions and art: incapable of accounting 
for anything. 
The problema of history lie within the field of consciousness, end here in partie-
ular the impotence or materialisu st&nds revealed. It undertakes to explain thout;ht end 
conscience and the sense of agency as mere· products end manifestation~ of mstter end force. 
Uind and soul, are then, but motion and aggreGation. By the reag~gating of atoms and 
their forces in a being composed. solely or v.tomE, thought is producul. ~hought apparently 
bears no resemblance to motion, yttt the L'lf;.terialist must explain it as motion, and that 
only. Lt this point the opponents or IaatorialieL1 usu&lly urge oevural objections 
which seem to the ·.vritor lacking in the deciaiveness cl&imed for tllem. They urge, for in-
stance, that upon the t::aterieliatic hYJ>Otheais the law of the conservation of energy break~ 
down at this point of the generation of thout;ht, that the physical energy which passes in-
to that form of motion called tl1ought it lost to tllis universe. ~hey also urge that upon 
the materialistic ba&is thought is functionless; and hence th6t here tJ8terialiem abandons 
one of its favorite doctrines, a corollory of the doctrine of nstural selection; namely, 
., 
that everything that is has somo function to perfonn. These objecticns do apply against 
I 
the positions assumed by certain materialists. lluxley, for e:xlimple, ar[;ues thF. t there is 
no evidence thct states of consciouunoss, tllemselves th~ result or molecular chanb~s in 
the brain, are in turn the causoe of other 1.10leculor changes which G'iVe rise to muscular 
motion. Asainat such a vio·.1 the objections above referred to would seem to be valid. 
But such a view ·would not seem to be necessarily involved in the l!aterialistic hypothe-
sis; for thought being conceived of as a form of motion, there is certainly nothing in-
consistent in affirming thr.t it pusses back into otlwr forms of mc,tion such as muscular 
action or heat. It mr..y rightfully be objected that it is beyond us to understand ho;v 
such a transformaticn tal:es place; but an ans·.1er is ready at hand: it io no more a mystery 
that the kind of motion c&lled thoubl1t should pass into forms of mution known to the phy-
eioist, thEm it is that motion and heht should in the first pl&ce produce thought. 
In other \70rds, it is a legitimate argmnent against the whole doctrine that it is 
incomprehensible; but it is not just to tho requirements or the doctrine to assert "that it 
must hold thought to be a fl.Ulotionless thing, a meaningless point of radiation at which 
the energy of the universe is running to loss. So far as consistency with itself is, 
concerned, materialism may very •tell hold its series of chauc;es in matter, conoei "t1e d of 
as including consciousness and all th&t is, to bo in the form of a circle, nothing being 
lost, each form ever moving on iuto others. This being the case, it iB futile to argue 
that materialism violates tho law of conservation and repudiates the law of natural eel-
' 
ection. The real arguuent against mat~ri&lism here, while awaitting that on that hypo-
thesis thought does lmve a fm1ction as a member of a circular series, will go onto show 
that such a function ie not adequate to explain lif~, and thst undt~r its light, or rather 
darkness, life's problem retJ&in enib.,.Jas. 
This iuadec:uacy is not the only argument Bb"Binst oatorialism. 'fJe pointed out 
at the close or th~ second parat.,'Taph above. tht.t the bat;al notions by ;1hich it seeks to 
explain cosmic order tre shown by the tests of logic to be mere empty abstractions; we 
have also suggested that it ib certainly open to the charge of utter incomprehensibility 
in its doctrine of the genesia and nature of oonsciousnese,- a weakness tacitly admitted 
,I 
i by' materialists in thoir futile attempts to describe thoug-ht as another face ~f matter. 
a parallelism etc. llaterialism has b~en overriduon and routed by attacks from these two 
directions: ita metaphysics and its psychology are both utterly discredited. The argument 
then, that suoh function as it allows to oousciouauess ia inadequate to t~>...-pl::.in human lifo, 
is not the only argwneut a~oiust mnterialism, but 1 t is th6 one with ·.1hi.ch we are here 
alone concerned. 
In a recurrent cycle of molecular motions there is no freedoc, no self-deter-
mination: all is necessitated change. This is the one nl~eged truth which material-
ism brings to bear up011 histor,y. agency is found in the individual only in the sense 
or instrumentality,- he is an agent in a series, but bound and dete~ined before and 
after. :.:aterialists do not always face this utter negation of human agency, it is 
generally more convenient to lose sight of it; it is covered by length:! discussions 
·and the introduction of maup: alleged tendencies and influences. For instance in-
stead of boldly str.ting thnt all human opinions and aims are the products of an at-
omic order moving by an absolute law of necessity, it is customary to say that all 
individual opinions and aims are determined by social traditions, and forces. That 
sounds pettor than to state that all human opinions and aims are necessitated, for it 
soems to imply that thouc;h we cannot &s indiv1..J.uols determine our tho'.lt;11tB and aims, 
yet "society'', a human thing, con determine them. But on this basis what is an in-
dividual? Not an independent unit of action and reection, but an inert, featureless 
blank. And what is "society"? Uothing, certainly, but a group of these non agents. 
If these individuals are but instrmaeuts, added toGether they are still but instru-
menta. If one indiviuual 1o a zoro so far as agency 1a concern~d,the sum of a mil-
ca.n 
lion human wills can be only zero. Thus the meterialiatAfind egency alone in nee-
esaitated motion. 
Uov1 let us bring.tllis philosophy to beer upon history, and see what light it 
sheds upon its probleus. First, \thy should there be progress or an ~volution in 
history? 1la.terial1em can respoud either by denying th~ fact of progress, or by 
introducing the •1ords latent and possibility, affirming that !r.atter need not reveal, 
at once, all that lies in it, but that much remains latent and unfolds in a necess- . 
l 
I 
itated temporal order. The denial or progreGs is nothing more thnn £< blind alley, 
for the real question. for naterinliem here is not whether the present is better 
.than the past, but simply ho;1 comes it that what now is is not the B1me ns what once 
l 
'res, how do you acc~..<unt for au evolving whether it be conceived or ns up or dO"Nll or 
on a level. The nns·;zer of r.mterielisru thnt there are latent possibilities in atoms 
,~, 
l 
leads beck to the field or metaphysior..l cri tioiam,and has thoro been shovm, tir.1e 
and time again, to be a mere empty verbal abstraction. 
In the second place, Uaterialism, traciu~; all thought end all conduct to a 
single fountain pouring forth its blindly necessitated stream, reduces all thought and 
all conduct to the plane of a like quality and a like authority. The ravings of the 
a.u 
maniac are as lW.thoritative as the\forcls of the sage. 1iurder should not be repro-
bated nor parental devotion praised, for both are alike necessitated. Uietzsche, the 
modern high-priest or u~torialism, pleads for the absolute supremacy or the strong,and 
prouounces the christian ideals of sympathy and service to be the most egregious blun-
ders that hnve ever crept into human thougllt and conduct. In making dh;criminations 
between the worth of various types of conduct he is not consistent with the phil oro phy 
he propounds; his contention, however, that true conduct is an unrt::strainod exercise of 
all one's po-.vers in order to achieve sel!-am,'Tandis:ement, is a plea for the only moral-
ity possible upon a roatorialistio basis. Suoh a moral1t:r is, of course, no morality 
at all. For mo.torialism a standnrd by which moral discriminations are macle ie:· utterly 
impossible; ;vhere o.ll actiou ia necessitated, all is equally authoritative. 
!am's sense of freedom and agency upon auoh a hypotllesie, must likewise. ! be 
pronounced a delusion. Ho thinks he is free: he deliberates nncl considers alternAtive 
possibilities or actiou, balances wotives, feels tho weight of obligotion f,nd the lash 
or tho approval of conscience, clings to an ideal in the face ~r strong conflicting 
desire- and yet it is all dulueive, all :.:eaningless. UO?I ;fith such n philosophy in 
mind let one examine the narratives of the historians. He will not find one author, 
and it is to be remembered th.ct r01)ny avowed materialists ho:Te 7trf:tten histcr:r- "wt o::e 
'.·:,,:; h.;; been consistent ·.1i tll this ph: lcsophy. Tho human spirit rebels; it will not 
.contradict and deny i teelf. I.Ian iu~ists on being a person, not a mere cog in the 
world.-me.chine • If any writer \1111 hold his thouijht consistent with the doctrine of 
. necessitated action, keep hie wind from despair and ineeni ty in the face of tho moral 
~nd menttl confusion \ihervby intro<lucocl, long onour;h to ·.trite a history, and finnlly, 
if he succeed in coercing l&llb"Ullt;e into uses sL-ainst >7hich it hLr., through tho see, 
eucceaafully rebelled-then ho >7111 present the world with its f1 rst Bl>ecimen If history 
consistently written from the materinlistic staudpoiut. But he will die unhonored, for 
there will be found none capable of readine and understandir1g. 
Uonietic Personalism. 
wonistic ?ereon~lism confronts history with the thesis that the finite order is 
the expression of the nature of an absolute which embraces ell apparent discords, end 
reconciles them in ita perfect harmony. \/hat light does this hypothesis throw upon 
the three crucial raota whioll lie at the heart of the problem of efficient causation in 
history? 
First, as to the fact of an evolution in history, llonistic Personalist! is res-
tricted to one view: the finite order is the expression of the nature or the absolute. 
The absolute, by definition, is perfect, and all-inclusive; hence there oen be nothine 
in the universe inconsistent with perfection. This l1ypothesis does not seem to ex-
plain why there should be an evolution in the finite order. It says, simply, that all 
is a part of a perfect whole. How a perfect whole need take the course we see in the 
actual world is the real problem; and no amount of mere reiteration that the whole is 
really perfect will help us here. Ove1· against this asserted perfection in the ab-
solute, is seen the universally admitted imperfection of the finite. That perfection 
1s represented as the source of things, and all this imperfection is its wor:t. '.'lhy 
would not the world be rJore perfect wi thoti.t all this imperfect finite? ilould not an 
ideally perfect \vhole be that of which the parts also are perfect? Schopel\hauer se id, 
1n substance, that it mubt have been an ill-advised t;ed, who could m&ke no better sport 
tbnn to change himself into so lean and hunb~ a world. 
Absolutists vary in their attitude toward this problem. Bradley does not 
diseuse this matter at all; he refera to it several times, 'bu.t only to state that it is 
not necessary to raise such n question. (Bradley's Appearance and Reality PP• 184 and 
205). Other absolutists have, ho'.taver, confessed the difficulty here. woTaeSE'rd 
says (Studies in the Hegelian Oialeotio, Socs. 150, 1!53) .: "Does not our very failure 
to preceive the perfection of' the universe destroy it? In so far n& we do not see the 
perfection or the univorEe, we aru 110t perfect ourselves. And as ·.te nre parts of the 
universe, thnt cannot bo peri't.tct," .roachim admits the sru.1e difficuity.,-not one or them 
Jf 
attempts any solution, save only to affirm his inuividuol confidence, nevertllelese, in · ' 
the perfection of the infinite. 
Whatever view of this problem vte may be able to take, .~e are thrown back in any 
case upon our ability to unuorstenu ho·,, the imperfect is roconcilable and reconciled 
to an ultimate perfect. llonistic Persons.listl must answer to life's concrete needs, 
and satisfy life's interests- a thing admitted by its advocates, os we have observed, 
whenever they attempt to short how discord and imperfection may enter in to make up a 
greater perfection. Such efforts occupy themsleves v?ith illustrations such as that 
a discord heightens the harmony of r:ntsio, etc., and speedily reach their limits. ~hen 
the uniform practice is to fall back upon the declaration ~hat ~or the finite mind to 
demnnd light upon these things is essentially absurd, since these mwateries lie open 
only to the absolute. In other words, •te are uenied the ri~t to think of imperfection, 
evil, error, and sin as they affect man, and are cormnanded to think how they affect the 
universe as a whole; are rei!U(;Elted to abandon anthropomorphism and to try omniscience. 
But our whole problem gr~fls out of our present finite life and its needs; and life in-
sists, since it can do nothing else thLn go on living in this finite ondor, that it get 
some light and some help now. ~o call in an unknown to oxploin the kn~.1n, in an ad-
mittedly unkn~.vable way, is absurdly futile. 
Turning no·n to the problems of evil, error, and sin, we come to the field of 
life's great interests. Philosophy is r:l6n' s effort to formulate a retiono 1 and sat-
ie!actory conception of lnujl<in tjXl>erience; the problems of truth and error, good and 
evil, gather up into themselves the rabas of that experience. That philosophy has 
the best credentials which prt.:btJnta us VIi th th(;J most rational explauetion of these 
problems. At once, philosophy of the absolutist type steps fo~vard with the alai~ 
tbnt it alone fully meets this requirer:JOnt, for it alone closes its discussion of these 
~roblems ~ith the conclusion th~t error onu sin ere rationsl. Its universe is a rat-
ional univer'le, and heuoe th(.;re cuu be no room in it for anythint; that is non-rational. 
J.nd here nt the very be£;inning, we are at the heert of tile 'matter as to the 'attitude of 
the absolutist toward these probloms. 
The rationality we ought to dawnnu is a "four-squaru rbtionalitt': it r:mfJt 
satisfy intellectual, aesthetic, moral, null practical demands. The rationality.the 
absolutist presents us with is nn abstract thing and consists in the logicvl man-
ipulation of certain oOllCepts. He closes "iti th a "perfectly rational" uniTerse because 
he beean with one; at the outset he postulates it in his definitions, in closing he 
presents 1 t as a logical ueduction from .the definitions with which he be[,"ttn. Uo fault 
can be found ui th the logic intervening between the defini tiona and the conclusion: 
if the prir:lnry definitions aro correct, thfl deuuced \7orld-vie;7 nmst stand. The a'D-
solutist's perfectly rational universe is such, not by insight but by affimation. Its 
asserted perfection does not solve our life's urgent problems, and is impotent to sup-
port the motives and idefils \lithout which life loses its worth. 
Bradley, one of the xJoderu spokesmen of this school of philosophy, begim his 
discussion of error and evil l he uses tllis latter word as including moral as well as 
physical evil) Hith a notable declarution: "If our k.bsolute is possible: in itself, it 
seens hardly possible as thinea nre. For there are unueni:·ble facts with which it 
does not seem compatible. Tirror and evil, space, time, change and.mutabiltty, and 
the unique particularity of the 'this' and. the ':nine'- all these appebr to fall out-
side an inuividunl experience. ~o explain them a·;tay or to explain them, one of these 
courses seems necessary, and yet both seem impossible. J..nd this is a point on which 
I run allY.ious to be unuerstood. I reject·the offered uilelllr.l8, und deny the necessity 
of a choice between these two course~. I fully recognize the fncts. I do not make 
the smallest atte~t to expl~i11 their origin, and I emphatically deny the need for 
such an explanntion. In the first pl&ce to show ho71 and ~1hy the universe is so that 
finite existence belongs to it, is ut·11erly i:rnpossible".lCh. 16: p- 104) 
That Bradley t!dmits orror anu evil to be facts Gnu uoea not attor.Ipt to explain 
; them nway is not strange, b-..1t that he should declare that he makes no &ttempt to ex-
l 
'plain them at all is a very notable admission. That is precisely his statement, for 
the insertion of the expression "their ori!!in" as the particular thing about them that 
he makes no effort to explain, does not alter the cnso. To explain them at all is to 
disc·.1ss and throw light upon their real nature, and that ie notldug at sll aside from 
their origin. In other worus, the whole question concerning error and evil is 
precisely their originf and their nature 51s revealed b"J th&t o1·igiu. li' true to his 
admission, Bradley could not yrooeed a step in dealing with these problems. He elides 
forth, however, into a further discussion 'by a contention which could hardly hope to 
mask its own inadequacy from the moat o£-sual reader. Ee maintrdna that a doctrine 
is not to 'be condemned if it fail to explain all the facts, provided that it explains 
I 
most of them. ~hat is a perfectly true contention, but it has no bearinG here. The 
whole question about error and evil is involved in that question of origil1. If he 
refuses to consider the origin of error and evil, he has no foundation upon which to 
I 
build hie interpretation. i..Uythillb he may say will be empty and futile. 
Further evidence that absolutism makes no real attempt to throw light upon 
·. 
1these problems of the f'irlito, is seen in the denial or morality to the absolute. 
:Bradley 'beBins hie discussion of moral evil by the edmission that if the absolute is 
moral, then the whole d1lerJJD8 is insolua'ble (p 197). In other words, upon the plane 
·of the known and knowable the ,,?hole matter is insoluable. ~his is equivalent to hie 
·admission, quoted above, that he U.oos not claim to throw any light upon the subject. 
It is easy to see, tl1en, why this type of philosophy can never gi vo practical 
aid and incentive tc human lifo: such aid anu incentive LIUSt be built upon the know-
• 
able and the lrno-:m. It is customary for the absolutist to uefine mor&l evil aa,the 
conflict between the good and tlle bad ·.ti thin us, tho conflict which makes morality 
possible. If evil 1~ simply this conflict, or course, evil is necessnry. But this 
definition begs the whole question. Evil is not the conflict, but the ~rong termin-
ation of it. God, a perfect God, could have ollowed and maue possible the former; but 
could never force the defeat of man's better self. ~here is e vast difference between 
evil as a possibility and evil as an actuality. Bradley says that in opposing evil, 
morality is unconsciously uesiriug to becooe non-moral. That, of ccurs~, follo~s from 
his making moral evil necessary to morality. 
l 
t:cra l evil, an evil choice or will, as a 
J possi bill ty can 'be sho">"tn to be thus necessary; but to of firm that morel evil in the 
sense of an actual evil cl1oice is necessary to morality, iE utter nonsense, and lived 
up to, or rather do·;tn to, woulu be aubversi ve of dl worthy living. 
Such in brief is the trtlE.:trJeut ·of tl1e proble::l of error null of evil from tho 
absolutist standpoint. It it:~ not difficult to see ho-;1 utterly empty such a world-view 
is of both motive aud guid(;uoo iu practic~l living. I.Ic.ny pllilObophera of this type 
have lived noble and exemplary lives, but it has ooen in spite of tl1eir philosophy and 
not because of it. Seen from such a vie·.rpoint, truth and errcr, gcod and evil, ehnde 
a·:tay into each other, and ther£J cnu be no clear path for man's straining eyes and stag-
gering feet. Such utterances !-Hl tho following are all that this philosophy can offer: 
"Every finite truth or f'ac"t to sor:1e extent must be unreal and false, and it is irnpoasiblilt 
in 1 the end to certainly kno;l of any how false it may be;" and "'!here cannot be, in short, 
any hard and absolute distinction between truths and falaehoods." l Bradley's Ap .- Real-
ity-pp54l, 365). 
' ,, 
Absolutism makes both et~:.:·or and evil consist in discrepancy, thus stripping 
them of real moral quality. It a1·£,--ues that truth end error are nut contradictory, but 
something less; that an assertion Til'llSt not necessarily be either right or ·.1rong, but 
that for us aud. for the preeent,it may not bL'either. In explaining tb.D.t evil subaerve s 
a i'inal good, and hence is itt.>eli" good, BrDdley suggests that query "whether and hO"n 
far it is as gc.cd as tht: ;Jill that is mor~l", b'.lt pnsse& it with the prOiuise thnt he 
will discuss it later (p-202). Ii" he ever returned to this crucial question he has 
failed to include any eviucnco of it in th8 voluue in i7hich this prouise is made. True, 
he subser:uently discusses it (Choptera 24 and 25), but his entire discussion is a man-
·ipulating of an abstract defiui tion which he lays down, namely, that e.nything is truer 
or better as it approaches Renlity. Reality here, it i:; to be rel'Jembered, is the ab-
solute or totality. 110".7 iu tho doductions and rbfinements based upon that defirl.i tion, 
be presents us with an nbstrnct, lo£,-icnl discussion both pleabiug E.nd profound; but he 
affords no renl light or help for a Ytoyfnrinc; man struggling in the i~Jshmentf; of error 
~nd evil. no prnctical guidance he ·;;ill f'inl.l; though of such stEitements aa. this he 
Will find a plenty: "To bo ueart!r the central heart oi" thin:;s is to do:ninote the ex-
',1 
tremi ties more widely; but it is uot to appear there except incO!:Ipletuly ~nd partially 
ihrough a sign, an unsubstantial nnd-fi fugitive mode of expression. Uothiug anywhere, j 
not even the realized and solid moral ·;1ill, can either be quite real, os it exit~ts in J ble, or can quite appear i u ito o .m as,. en ti •1 c hna c tc:. S Or.let imo s he ·.1i 11 come upon 
8taten:enta more concrete: "ll-11 thct .76 need unuerstand here is that 'He[lven' a design', l' "0 ""Y speak eo, can real he itaelf •• effectively in •catiline or Borr,ia' a e in 
., -------
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the scrupulous or innocent. 
here has been confined, and is therefore incomplete". (Br~dley Appearance and Real-
ity pp 382, 202). And if auyHhare he meets with exhortations to high endeavor, he 
wHl find the appeal based upon the \7ri ter' s goodness of heart and uot upon the re-
quirements of his philosophy. It is true that this worldviev'l holds up a perfect stand-
ard in the being of the absolutu, but there is no human help here, for the absolute 
is super-personal, a11cfthen our inL!uirer triea to define thEtt to himself he has only 
the analogy of the personal anU. the sub-person&l by Tihich to comprehend it. ln be-
ing turned from the personal as his staud.ard, he is turned from the higlJest he knows 
to a loover standard by -,-;hich to try to comprehend ultimate reality. 
) The essential weakness of Lloniatic Personalism, then, is its inability to shed 
light upon these central problems of life and history. 17e shall close this part of 
the discussion by recording the edmiHsions of Taylor and lloTaggard on tl .. iE point, as 
the:r are quoted by James (Pluralistic Uuiven:~e. p-130-140 ). Taylor's statement con-
oerning the notion of the abr,oluto io that it "con T$}~e no addition to onr inforwation 
and can of itself supply no ruotivea for practical endE:lavor." 
main practical interest of IIegal's philosophy is to be found in the austrL:Act cE:Jrtainty 
which the logic gives us that all reality is rntionsl and righteous, even when i7e can-
not see in the leat1t how it is ao. I:ot that it shows us how the fE..cts arotmd ua are 
good, nor that it shews us h<m \le oau make them better, but tl~&t it prove~; that t1Jey, 
like other reality, aru .sub specie etonities, perfeotly good, and sub specie temporis, 
I ~ 
destined to become perfectly t;ood. 
c. ?lur&listic ?E:lrsonali~m. 
Pluralistic personalism maintains that all agency is versonE:l, and that there 
is a pluralHy of persona. It differs from uouistio personalism, ceoentially, in that 
it oonoei ves the finite to be endm1eu •1i th a eubstauti&l free don which constitutes 1 t 
a real factor in the affairs of tlw world. at this point, indet;d, 1 a found its rad-
ical divergence fruHl both r.aat<.;rialisll1 &n<l rJoniew all its other tenets follo-.v from 
this one. It will be our purpose, as in the discussion of the two previously pre-
sented worldviewe, to point out briefly the licht which such an h~rpothesis thro-ns 
upon the three crucial facts of liff:l and history. llo shall, hcwever, reverse the 
order in which we have been considel'ing these three f!tcts, since the fundnmentnl 
tenet of pluralistic persout.lism, as 11e have just pointed out, hss to do with that 
one of the facts which \70 he.ve been Llentioning last, nar:!ely,- the sense of freedom 
in man; and since what it has to say upon the other points results from its position 
upon this one. 
We have previously argued th~t the fact or an innate conviction of freedom in 
man is the very heart of thia problem of the interpretation of life and history. As 
against both materialism and 1.1onisn, pluralistic personcliam decluros this inner con-
viotion to be tl'Ue• Hegel, interpreting history fron the monistic viei7-point,at-
tempts to provide for indiviuual character by asserting thLt there is one stage upon 
which the Infinite acta, which is alone the stage of history properly so called,and 
another stage for individual initiative and morality. (Phil. of liistvr:J pp 6C·~l·). A 
similar procedure is follovled by all writers of this school when thE::y posit t;to or-
ders of experieuce- the finite as such, and. the absolute r.e such. ~11 such attempts 
fail their purpose. 'i'hey bogin and end in evasive abstractions >~hich ::le&n nc thin~, 
and which, when forceu to t.1ean something and to speak in intelligible terr:~s, are at 
once seen to be inconsistent ':ii th essential ooniam. The philosophical thought of 
the world rmtst more and r.10re converge upon this point of inuivioual sgency which is 
the key to the whole problem. The testing of philosophic~l views in the li[".,ht of the 
concrete interests of life has more and more focused attention here; but still, in the 
main, the tides of philosophical battle roll far afield here anu tl1ere ond yander. It 
is our conviction that · . .,e need to taako a nmch wider and more candid examination of our 
philosophies both in the mirror of our O'.m consciousness &nd in thu .lorger mirror of 
racial histor;,r, each reflection correcting onu aupplmenting the ot:t:or; and that such 
an examination will bring great colivictions to be:ar \lith comr.1on consent upon life, and 
Will gloriously viudicute the enlluiriug mind, furnishing ~bundant a ttestatiou thnt hu-
J:Jani ty is capable of knoJiug truth. The sE::nse of freedc.m is tlle ci tndel which stands 
as a fortress and a watch-tower overlooking all the plains of life; enu from ita outlook 
j 
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we must all, looking,as we then shall, upon the same scenes, see alike,- a thing 
that will forever be impossible so long as v;e struggle amid the entan€;lements of the 
hillsides and low-lands. 
Pluralistic personalism insists that a real line of der.JE.rcotion separetes the 
finite from the Infinite. They are both real fnctors in the world. Between them 
there is room for all the facts ·<~e see and ib r real interpretation of these facts. 
The monist as \7e ha'le noticeu above, vainly tries to posit t·;,o orders of experience, 
but they do not remain apart: his monism overrules the distinction and t11ey flow to-
gether, 1eavi1~ all assurted differences as to couuuct ann belief mere nonsense. Some-
times pluralism and monism seom to approach each other very closely when viewed from 
certain angles; and yet in reality the line of de~Jnrcation is very dibtinct. For in-
stance, t;tonisu ever holds sin anu error to be synonymous w1 th incompleteness and fin-
itude. no.1, when pluralistic pereobalism, holding that the possibility of sin and er-
ror is rooted in wan's freedom, adds to that funuamentbl conception the E>flsertion that 
limitation of kno'i7ledge lind experience rrmat issue in many failuree, it seems to approach 
very near to the mouistio vie''· Iu reoli ty, hottever, they &re very wide epf:rt. In 
the monistic view all has been as tho Infinite would have it; iu tho other, not all 
has been as tho Infini to nould have hud it. lionists try to cloak the e;revi ty of mak-
ing man's sins God's, but thoy cannot. Liebnitz did as well as possible in this re-
speot and his failure is obvious even on tho aurft.ce. He declared that God is re-
lated to the ".7orld of actual forces as the stream is rolated to the boat ',7hich floats 
upon it. The boot is not hindereu by the stream but only by objects on the bl nk or 
in its courf:e• ".bnd God is as little the C?use of evil £s the current of the river 
is the cause which ret[;rda the movewunt of tbo boat." (':'heotlicy p 91). He fails to 
tell us what these hinderiug objects are, but it is plain th&t upon the basis of con-
sietent monism they are as t.T..tch Gou as is tLe etronm, for the •. bsoluto must be all-
inclusive. 
Consistent !:lonism, as ·ro have sniu rrnst look upon error llU<l eln as~epriv­
ation. It is then not at all a (;uustion of quality that ·::e Ileal ·;:ith here, bUt purely 
a t.·uestion of quantity. Drror and evil ore nocesl'i ties to the b6auty and perfection 
of the whole, They are but the ahauo·:ts that enhance the beauty of the picture, the 
barbarisms that serve as a foil to poetic elet~nce. The fires of hell are required 
in a scene that is to be lighted up to the glory of its l:aktJr. The corruption that 
forms in humanity' a wounua is but "laudable pus." Sensuality, intemperance, and 
greed are but the carrying forward of a pl&n for the advancement of tho race. The 
pauper bringing into the ;1orld children that he cannot feed is a great benefactor to 
society, since he adds to the sharpness of the world-wide struggle for existence. 
Adultery, drunkenness, and all the rest, nre but ne·.1 eXTJeriments made by a life ever 
g11shing forth in its holy instincts which "seek upvmrd by any means." 
now upon an hypotheuis of finite identity and responability all these ndsurd-
ities are flatly contradicted. Allowance is to be mode for blunderings committed in 
ignorance: these are not ~:~ius, though followed by penalties which spur us to seek higher 
paths. But after all such allo·;;ance is ~::.ade, there still romaine sin, a qualitative 
thing, a wilful failure to obey tho vision of right, a f'c.:ilure bringing with~t a sense 
of' condemnation. That sin is not ignorancu clingilJ.G to rmn t s he leaves the animal 
behind, is ahmm incidentally by the plain fact that m·~n is not eve17.1here leaving the 
animal behind. Sin is an unrational thiug. In harmony with tho conclusion of physic-
logists pluralistic personalism finds th~t there is no "laucl&.ble pus", that sin is 
always milignant and only malignant. 
Upon the hypothesis of pluralistic personalism the otherwise hopeless puz::lea 
that grow out of the fact of prO[,'Tess in history are, like-;lise, e&sily resolved.. In 
the human spirit unfolding iu self-dt~turtlined character center all the interests of 
life. It is impossible to understand. in the least why an Abt:wlute Perfect! on should 
evolve; it ia very easy to see why a f'rt1e mor&l agent must evolve. The grent deter-
minative thing about a fr1:1e r.e;eut I'!IU.at be its voluntary attitude toward the available 
truth and standards of' right. The exact stage of fulnes~; in such av&ilable tr'.lth is 
indifferent so far as a possibility of responsible character is CO!lcerned. Thus it is 
easily seen how man cun be trained in clwructer in most diverse st~'f;os of civilization. 
The stage of' culture upon '17hich a soul findc schooling ie relatively indifferent. .A 
cannibal who is 111lling to r.1ensurtJ up to the stanuards prevailiug in the oo ciety into 
which he wae born has achievud as ~rert character as an !merican rtilling to contorm to 
~;l 
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the standards of that tiue and plnce in \lhich be finds himself. The first feeble stepS 
forward in civilization rt~present &s great victories as atw th&t can pos.sibly follO\V• 
It is just as possible to achieve character on the plnin of primitive culture as when 
society entered the pastoral stago and found more leisure for reflection and observation. 
If it be argued that such a vie\l \7ould make us indifferent to the l:no71ledgeof our time, 
the objection would prove that the point had been missed. ':i.'he crucial fact is that, 
granted a free will, all conters in the attitude assumed toward the available knowledge, 
and nothing less than enthusiastic conquest will suffice. 
The above, however, is but a beginuing of a discussion of the problem, for, 
granting that the above coutttution be true, tbe inquiry still arises as to why the stage 
of culture hns changed for each generation. If responsible cl~r&cter be possible upon 
a given plane, why should another plane forthwith be substituted for it? llere again 
satisfactory explanation is poosible upon the basis of pluralistic personalism. It may 
be worth while to refer, in passing, to the fact that a totally inodef;u.nto solution of 
this problem is often accepted; namel!', that the race is a unit and th!lt the epochs end 
generations of history entt:r into it just as the yo&rs aud mouths the life r:l an indi vid-
ual • This vie\v, which hE.s vitiated much of tho historical and sociologicr,l •vri tinge 
of the world even down to the present dv.y, is but an illustration of tlle fallacy of the 
universal: it is the survivLl of the olu scholaatic aberration of the existence of un-
iversals. Turing away from such an explanation s.nd holding firmly to a real identity 
and freedom in the individual nnd to its corollary or the possibility of responsible 
. 
character upon any stage of culture and lookinG upon the centuries of unfolding history, 
we see the spectacle of each gtnh:ration, throush its chcicef' and oats, setting the stage 
for the next, each adU.ing a story to humauity's roal tower of Dabel, no iudivid.ual nor 
generation Of individuals uefeatiug the possibility Of justice for the next, and yet 
each individual and each e,reneratil1n leaving their works behind in thif> age-long structure 
aa inspiring marks of ueauty or scnr& of ilan1iug. 
Conclusion. 
llan's last reasoned ph~losophy of life is identical with hi:: first,- a conviction 
of freedom aud agency. I.!an's last v1orship is at one with his first,- e. love of God 
; 
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and 8 dread of sin. The great need of the d.ny is a repudiation of fatalism alike 
in the individual life and in the interpretation of history. Upon the plane of 
individual life this emancipation is more nearly realized than is tlle CDSe in our 
treatment of history. Hegel provided for individual freedum, though only by being 
thoroughly inconsistent ',lith his ovm philosoplly; but his conception of history 
is fatalistic. Hegel once ruled the philosophic thought of thEl :Jorld, but his sup-
rernaoy has passed, although he yet hat; a host of follo\lers. i3ut the majority of those 
who reject his philosophy &s such, still look vti th favor upon his philosophy of 
history. They speak one language i7hen tre&ting of the intlividual life, lind another 
and contradictor:! one when they discuss 1Jistcry. Thus the treatment of history runs 
on largely indif%1·ent to the course of philosop1lical develop:.:ent. '-!e hcve fought 
the sensationalist to a st&ndotill or rather to a precipitious· rout, but we complacent-
ly ano·,,. the Honist to write our histor-J, and accept everything he writbs. The great 
battle today in philosophy is between monistic and pluralistic persvnelism. It may 
not be possible to bring all into one ca~. nevertheless our primary contention holds: 
we should insist thnt when the materialist, or the monist or the pluralist writes 
history that he consistently apply his philosophy to thu work in hc.nd. Our plea is 
for an honest fncing of the problem of efficient causntiou by every writer of history, 
and our faith is tht.t such a cvurse will prove Eit one and tho same tine the grenteat 
possible impetus to both philosophical and historicnl pro&Tess. 
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